Soviet thermonuclear bomb


The creation of thermonuclear weapons in the USSR:
  second stage of the nuclear race

Thundering on August 29, 1949 at the Semipalatinsk test site, the first Soviet nuclear explosion equalized the chances of two world supergiants of the post-war time, the USA and the USSR, in the race for a decisive advantage in military technology. Alas, this race could not end with the status quo reached.

First, there was a rapidly progressing global polarization of the world, accompanied by a rapid increase in the tension of the international situation as a whole — the climate of the Cold War was forming. The combination of these factors sharply increased the chances of a direct military confrontation, which made both superpowers consider the advanced development of modern military equipment to be the highest state interest.

Secondly, to become in the second half of the 40s. the nuclear powers, both the USA and the USSR, needed to create and unleash the monstrous inertia flywheels of the national military-nuclear complexes. On the example of the USSR, we have already seen what forces and means this required, but more importantly, it was impossible to stop (or at least slow down) these flywheels, and even taking into account the above political realities - an evil deity through the mouths of its priests paradoxically, the most talented scientists, the true patriots of their countries) demanded more and more victims on the altar of creating weapon systems that were already difficult to imagine in their destructive power. Shy attempts to resist this terrible logic on the part of some American scientists did not have the slightest success, as they could not affect anything the front-line position of some of the great Soviet physicists (in particular P.L. Kapitsa). It was still far from the first demarches of A.D. Sakharov against super-powerful nuclear tests in the atmosphere, and the warning of outgoing D. Eisenhower about the potential danger of an omnipotent military-industrial complex for the national security of the country will not be heard soon. Awareness of the senselessness of the accumulation of excess armaments was not even seen after several decades of fear and mutual hostility. Then, in the late 40s - early 50s, in an atmosphere of xenophobia and the philosophy of the “besieged camp” of the last years of Stalin’s life in the USSR and McCarthyism in the United States, protests and warnings were doomed to complete misunderstanding of not only politicians (this is understandable), not only scientists from nuclear laboratories and military institutes and employees of the defense industry (which is also not surprising), but also the general population. So it was in the USA, and so it was in the USSR, where, in the conditions of post-war devastation, spending all new millions of rubles on the arms race forced many to starve in the most direct sense of the word.

Finally, thirdly, the basic principle of creating a new weapon, it seemed, was itself given in the hands. Indeed, even a superficial acquaintance with nuclear physics said: it is possible to release the colossal energy hidden in the atomic nucleus in two ways: to divide the heaviest nuclei (uranium present in nature or artificial plutonium obtained) or make the lightest (hydrogen isotopes) merge. The first of these paths (fission reaction) was implemented in atomic weapons (however, as we shall see, it could not be otherwise). It seemed that the time had come for the implementation of the second one (fusion reaction), especially since he had promised excellent prospects in solving such an important task for weapon physicists as the sharp increase in the power of nuclear weapons required by the military.

The fact is that attempts to carry out this increase within the framework of the construction of nuclear explosive devices (HLV) division encountered serious difficulties. The fundamental principle was the contradiction between the requirement of increasing the amount of fissile material (uranium, plutonium) in a supercritical state, on the one hand, and ensuring subcriticality of the structure until the moment of explosion, on the other. Each new kiloton of design charge power, starting from 70-80 kt, led to an avalanche of increasing technical difficulties, which, with a power of over 100 kt, became insurmountable. And although some time later, thanks to the implementation of new physical ideas and models by both Soviet and American scientists and engineers, they managed to realize fairly compact designs of purely dividing HLLs with a capacity of several hundred kilotons, it was already clear that the future was in fusion reactions.

After all, materials based on lightweight elements of critical mass do not have. With appropriate conditions, both grams and kilograms will react, which until then may be contained in the design in any quantity, state, and mutual configuration. From the point of view of the designer, this is already quite a few, but light substances and, like the actual nuclear explosive, are extremely effective. For example, with the full reaction of nuclear fusion in the optimal mixture of heavy and super heavy isotopes of hydrogen (deuterium and tritium) energy is released 4.2 times more than with full nuclear fission of the same mass of uranium-235!

So, the principle of creating a new, much more powerful weapon was evident. It was a matter of “small things” - in practice, to ensure the very conditions for the reactions of the synthesis of light elements. But it turned out to be incredibly difficult ...

So, the second stage of the nuclear race has started. It all started again, but in completely different conditions. And without awareness of the essence of these differences, it is impossible to create a version of events free from obvious contradictions. But this is also not easy - it is enough to get acquainted with the sharp controversy in the press, not only between American and Russian researchers and witnesses of the events, but also between the designers of the Soviet thermonuclear weapons (TNW) - VB Adamsky and GAGoncharov, Y. S. Smirnov and LP Feoktistov!

The only thing in common was a clear understanding of the fundamental physical bases of the action of a new weapon, both atomic and thermonuclear. They have been known since the mid 30s. - for ignition of thermonuclear fuel, undoubtedly, huge temperatures and pressures are required. Here (and perhaps only here) you can draw an analogy with the creation of atomic weapons, when the main, fundamental physical principle (nuclear fission chain reaction) and the main idea of ​​its implementation (creating the supercritical state of fissile material) were also known.

The main, key point in the development of atomic weapons was the development of the necessary amount of fissile material. In other words, with all the importance of the scientific problems arising in this connection (in solving which, by the way, intelligence helped very effectively), the main thing was “hand work” - the construction and forced operation of huge mines and cyclopean plants (like plants-817, - 813 and -418). The most high-tech part of the work (the design of the HLL) was incomparably smaller. As we remember, by the time the first plutonium was received at the 817 plant, all design work at KB-11 was completed (and not in the same variant), so that between this moment and the first atomic test, not even a month passed. Also, in general, the case was with the Americans. Let us add here a large "specific weight" of the organizational side of the matter - the creation of the structure of the Manhattan project in the USA and the system of the Special Committee (SC) and the First Main Directorate (PGU) in the USSR.

At the stage of extensive deployment of TNW creation, uranium mines, research laboratories, nuclear plants and plants were mainly built, organizational structures worked intensively (moreover, their presence in itself largely spurred the nuclear race). Questions about the development of new materials necessary for tactical nuclear weapons (for example, tritium and lithium-6 deuteride), of course, arose, but their relative importance was immeasurably lower. The main thing was different: in the search for physical and technical ways of realizing the conditions for an explosive synthesis reaction. In other words, if the development of atomic weapons was still basically an organizational and engineering-technical problem, the struggle for the possession of tactical nuclear weapons was a “battle of brains”, a distant battle between the intellectual potentials of the two superpowers.

There was another important difference. The main scientific directions in the development of atomic weapons were neutron physics and gas dynamics (hydrodynamics of a compressible fluid). By the mid 40s. these were quite established areas of physics with theoretical, experimental, and methodological support. Creating the same tactical nuclear weapons required the emergence of completely new physical disciplines - the physics of high-temperature plasma, ultrahigh energy densities, anomalous pressures, etc. These processes in nature occur only in the depths of the stars, and they can only be investigated with the help of theory and mathematical modeling. Far from being an accident, a huge role in the development of TNW belongs not only to theoretical physicists — Tamm and Teller, Sakharov and Bethe — but also to mathematicians — Ulam and Tikhonov, Everett and Samara, and many others.

At the start: first ideas and approaches. Deadlocks own and stolen (1946 - 1952)

In the USA, the idea of ​​initiating thermonuclear reactions in a medium from deuterium with the help of the division of the HLSD, which was actively developed then, first appeared, probably in 1941, during the conversations of E. Fermi and E. Teller. Back in 1942, E.Teller first advanced the general concept of the device, called the "classic super." It acquired a relatively complete view by the end of 1945. It was about the initiation of an atomic bomb based on 235U nuclear detonation in a long cylinder with liquid deuterium, equipped with an intermediate “ignition” chamber with a deuterium-tritium mixture, since the cross section for the synthesis of deuterium with tritium is almost 100 times larger than the number of deuterium nuclei among themselves. Figuratively speaking, tritium was supposed to play the role of a glass of gasoline splashed into a big bonfire in order to kindle it with one match.

In 1946, it was proposed to use the radiation of the primary uranium charge as the main physical substance, for which the deuterium-tritium mixture was required to be taken out of its limits and surrounded by the volume of its localization with an opaque coating. That is how the fundamental principle of operation of modern tactical nuclear weapons - radiation implosion was born.

However, this proposal is well ahead of time. Then the theoretical calculation methods for studying the most complicated processes occurring in a device of this kind (first of all, mathematical modeling) were absent, and without them its practical implementation was impossible. We are talking about the methods, not the hardware, which were the first computers (such as ENIAK D. von Neumann). It is well known that the Soviet scientists compensated for the lag behind the United States in the field of computer engineering by developing sophisticated computational methods that made it possible to carry out the most complicated calculations on very primitive equipment (for example, on Mercedes electromechanical calculators). This is where and how the enormous possibilities of the Russian and Soviet mathematical school affected!

It remains only to name the authors of this magnificent conjecture, issued by the joint priority application of 05/28/46. This is a famous mathematician, physicist and cybernetic D. von Neumann and ... Klaus Fuchs! Yes, yes, that very K. Fuchs, the most significant source of the most important intelligence information! He was attracted to work on the "classic super", probably at the end of 1944 and knew a great deal about him. Naturally, from the beginning of 1945, information began to enter the USSR. Already in March 1945, a message was received about E. Teller as the leader of the work on the creation of a “superbomb” with an explosive equivalent of up to 1 million tons of trinitrotoluene (TNT). Then came the message of physico-technical nature. There were no great hopes for the practical feasibility of these projects, but it was emphasized that the “hydrogen bomb” should be dealt with at least until its impracticability was proved.

However, until August 1945, these data did not have any noticeable consequences. For this to happen, it took Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since the beginning of the autumn of 1945, the attitude to the Fuchs reports acquired a completely different character: the management of the Investigation Committee and the Perm State University knew very well that Fuchs was a first-class physicist capable of performing the primary semantic filtering of the incoming material.

It is curious that in the history of the creation of the Soviet TNW there was an episode that evokes some analogies with the letter of GN Flerov to Stalin. 09.22.45 I.V. Kurchatov received a memo from the older generation of theoretical physicist Ya.I.Frenkel, where attention was drawn to the promise of using atomic munitions to "conduct synthetic reactions (for example, helium formation from hydrogen) that ... could even more increase the energy released in the explosion of the main substance - uranium, lead [! - AK], bismuth [! - AK]. ” Ya.I. Frenkel, without a doubt, did not have access to intelligence on the atomic problem, and the naivety of mentioning lead and bismuth once again proves it. Nevertheless, his high professional qualifications (confirmed by the pioneering work on the physics of division) did not cause any doubts.

Most likely, the decision-making mechanism for deploying work on tactical nuclear weapons was to some extent the same - having in mind everything, not to take anything on faith and be consistent with the possibilities, circumstances and common sense. The greatest merit of the leadership of the UK and PSU (primarily I. Kurchatov) is that it did not allow the problem of tactical nuclear weapons to drown in the swamp of innumerable current affairs related to the development of atomic weapons. However, the objective limitations of forces and means (personnel shortage in the first place) in 1945-1947. nevertheless, it has postponed its mark on the development of work on TNW.

12/17/45 at the meeting of the Technical Council of the UK, a message prepared by I.Gurevich, Ya.B. Zeldovich, I.Ya.Pomeranchuk and Yu.B. Khariton “Using the nuclear energy of light elements” prepared on the instructions of I.V. Kurchatov was heard. In its purely theoretical aspect, it considered the possibility of initiating nuclear detonation in a long cylinder with deuterium. It is difficult to say whether at least one of the authors, Yu.B. Khariton, was acquainted with K. Fuchs’s information on the “super” (I. Gurevich, in particular, was categorically denied), but in any case the speech is undoubtedly It is about the first purposeful step of the Soviet scientists.

There were no other steps, however, for almost two years, and the work in the field of thermonuclear research almost stopped. Only at the Institute of Chemical Physics in Moscow, A.S. Kompaneets and S.P. Diakov under the direction of Ya.B. Zeldovich continued the theoretical study of the problem of non-equilibrium nuclear burning of deuterium. It cannot be ruled out that one of the reasons for such “oblivion” (which, undoubtedly, was the general scientific and technical policy of the UK and PSU leaders) was a meeting of the Soviet physicist (and “part-time” and intelligence officer) Ya.P. Terletsky in Copenhagen 14 and November 16, 1945 with N. Bor. To the question about the "superbomb" (precisely in such a formulation, approved by L.P. Beria), Bohr answered very skeptically: "What is a superbomb? This is either a bomb of greater weight than it has already been invented, or a bomb ... from some new substance ... The first is possible, but meaningless, because destructive force<...>   and so very great, and the second, I think, is unreal ”[italics mine. - A.K.]. Such an answer could well contribute to the decision to concentrate the intellectual and material resources of the USSR as much as possible only on the creation of a fission bomb.

From a retrospective point of view, it is clear that the gradual, evolutionary development of work on TNW in the USSR during these years was unreal. Some kind of event was needed that could give them an impulse as powerful as Hiroshima and Nagasaki - the work on atomic weapons. And this event was probably the information received by the Soviet intelligence officer A.S. Feklisov from Fuchs in London on 13.03.48.

This was their second meeting. The first occurred on September 28, 477, shortly after Fuchs returned from the United States to England, but she had no significant consequences. Why - it's hard to say; the excessive formalization of the request may have played a role (Fuchs answered ten questions from Feklisov). On 13.03.48, however, essentially the entire “classic super” project fell into Soviet intelligence hands around the beginning of 1947, including the cross sections for the reaction between deuterium and tritium nuclei, the general design of a bomb based on the principle of radiation implosion, and an ignition unit. But in these documents, as in the earlier ones, there was no fundamental theoretical proof of the principal possibility of non-equilibrium (explosive) burning in a cylinder with deuterium, this possibility was only postulated.

However, no one paid attention to this circumstance (later, as we shall see, which became fatal for the fate of the “classic super”). However, maybe then it was not the main thing. But for members of the highest political leadership of the country (April 20, 1948, the leadership of the MGB of the USSR sent the Russian translation of Fuchs’s materials to I.V. Stalin, V.M.Molotov and L.P. Beria) it became completely clear that it was much more important: The development of new super-powerful weapons is under way, there is a real risk of lagging behind, which could be fatal for the country. It is necessary to take retaliatory measures as soon as possible.

04.23.48 L.P. Beria sends Fuchs materials to the head of the PGU, B.L.Vannikov, and I.V. Kurchatov, and I. B.Hariton, to prepare the necessary proposals. These proposals were taken as the basis for the resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers on the Supplementing the Work Plan for KB-11, signed by I.V. Stalin on 10.06.48, which obliged to create a special hydrogen bomb (RDS-6) group in KB-11. By another decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the most important organizational measures were determined from the same day. In particular, it obliged the Physical Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences (Director - Academician SI Vavilov), famous for the brilliant school of research of nonequilibrium processes, “to organize research work on the development of the theory of deuterium combustion according to the assignments of Laboratory No. 2 (Yu.B. Khariton, Ya. B. Zeldovich), for which to create in two days<…>   special research group under the direction of corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR I.Ye.Tamma ... ”. Interestingly, the same decree improved the living conditions of a number of work participants, in particular, the room was given to A.D. Sakharov, a young employee of the I.Ye.Tamm group. (This is how her future creator began working on the hydrogen bomb!) On the same day, Fuchs materials were sent to Ya.B. Zeldovich for familiarization. He led the work on the study of nuclear detonation of deuterium. In Moscow, in addition to the group of I.Ye.Tamma (S.E. Belenky, A.D. Sakharov, later V.L. Ginzburg and Y.A. Romanov), A.S. Kompaneets and S. took part in the works. P.Dyakov. None of them had access to intelligence information. This day, 10.06.48, was the birthday of the first concrete Soviet thermonuclear project - the "pipe", as it was soon baptized because of the supposed geometric shape of the future bomb.

So, it began ... The wording such as “two-day terms”, “improvement of living conditions” and “the strictest personal responsibility”, so characteristic of the “early atomic history” of the USSR, meant in aggregate only one thing: the project received the highest state priority, it should be implemented price and in the shortest possible time. As for the costs (and, if necessary, of human lives, in the office of L.P. Beria, they were used to looking at it calmly), then they were supposed to be counted later, if it is considered at all.

Nature, however, sometimes turns out to be stronger than orders and threats. The damned proof of the possibility of detonation of deuterium in the "tube" was unattainable - the solution eluded theorists, and without this the beginning of the design work was out of the question, since even the approximate parameters of the device were unclear. The essence of these difficulties was as follows. For any detonation (chemical or nuclear) there is a certain minimum radius of the detonation cord, below which the required explosive mode is not carried out - the substance flies out before it has time to burn. But due to some features of the interaction of radiation with matter (the presence of the so-called inverse Compton effect, the significance of which was first pointed out by E. Fermi) for a high-temperature nuclear plasma there is not only a lower, but also an upper limit radius. The whole difficulty was that the theoretical values ​​of the lower (spreading) and upper (radiative) radii turned out to be very close. And if we take into account that the extreme complexity of the formal description of the processes in the “pipe” did not allow us to do without physical assumptions, then the question of the existence of a “gap” of admissible solutions between these radii remained unclear in principle; even now it is not known whether this problem has a solution in this formulation.

Nevertheless, the torment with the "pipe" in the group of Ya.B. Zeldovich continued for quite a long time. Looking ahead, we say that only at the beginning of 1954, the famous meeting in the Ministry of Environment Protection (with the participation of I. V. Kurchatov, I. E. Tamm, A. D. Sakharov, Ya. B. Zeldovich and L. D. Landau), who replaced PGU as the headquarters of Soviet atomic science and industry, recognized the complete futility of work on the "pipe". According to the figurative expression of Yu.B. Khariton and VB Adamsky, these were “the funeral of a pipe according to the first category”.

Nothing worked well in Los Alamos by E. Teller with the prototype of the “pipe” - “super”. And it could not have happened - the laws of physics are the same in the USSR and in the USA. However, the realization of the conceptual deadlock in which the problem turned out came to E. Teller “under aggravating circumstances”. On January 27, 50, in London, K.Fux arrested yesterday signed a confession about his many years of intelligence activities in favor of the USSR. And after only 4 days (Jan. 31.50), US President G.Trumen sent a directive to the US Atomic Energy Commission on the resumption of work on the creation of the superbomb. Of course, these 4 days are almost certainly a coincidence; rather, it was a somewhat belated reaction of the American leadership to the first Soviet nuclear test (08.26.49). However, it is possible that it was Fuchs’s failure that caused Truman’s new directive, which appeared after a month and a half and made the development of tactical nuclear weapons among the highest government priorities of the United States. E. Teller: “... the irony of history<...>   - the person who transferred our atomic secrets to the Soviet Union had such a strong influence on<…>   continued work on the creation of the hydrogen bomb.

Soon, Teller's colleagues — the mathematician Stanislav Ulam and his assistant Cornelius Everett — convincingly showed that the explosive flow of deuterium synthesis in the “super” volume is hardly possible, moreover, for the initial ignition of thermonuclear fuel it would take such an amount of tritium that for its production from lithium in industrial reactors the United States would have to practically freeze the production of weapons-grade plutonium for the gaining rate of production of HAVU division. Thus, the assumptions of the General Advisory Committee at the US CEA, whose members as early as the end of 1949 unanimously opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb, including on this basis, were confirmed. However, the reality turned out to be even worse ... “By the end of 1950, Teller was in despair, having lost hope of creating a workable hydrogen bomb design. The main program of creating new weapons of the United States was adopted on an insufficiently thought-out scientific basis. ”

At the same time, it became clear that the “secrets of the hydrogen bomb” that came to Kurchatov through Fuchs, were, in the words of Bethe, “not just useless, but much worse ... [if the Soviet experts actually used the information contained in the Fuchs reports, then ... - AK], we can only rejoice, because it means that they have to go bankrupt for the sake of a project of nothing militarily. ” They took advantage of, and indeed, a lot of things were really swept: the “pipe” in vain “ate” almost 6 years of work of the most qualified scientific “team”. For the first time during the work on the Soviet atomic project, intelligence contributed to bringing the most important scientific and technical problem to a deep conceptual impasse. This should be understood when, as applied to the development of tactical nuclear weapons, the next talk about “the power of Soviet intelligence” and “the powerlessness of Soviet science” comes to the media.

Nevertheless, the role of intelligence in the history of the creation of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons cannot be underestimated - it is huge, and its main achievement, as we have seen, was the initiation of large-scale work on the hydrogen bomb in the USSR. And besides ... when any large-scale scientific and technical problem begins to be solved from scratch (moreover, as in our case, in the absence of complete confidence in the attainability of the desired result in principle), the failure of the development of a certain concept is largely compensated by methodological developments that allow successfully solving similar tasks within the framework of other concepts, and the formation of effective research teams with their scientific and organizational hierarchy and division of labor. And if so, then other, promising, concepts come necessarily.

And they appeared by the end of 1948. From this point on, Soviet and American efforts to create tactical nuclear weapons diverged to meet again by the end of the seemingly far away 1955.

"Puff" (1948 - 1954)

At the end of August 1946, E.Teller released a report in which he proposed a new, alternative to the “classical super” scheme of a thermonuclear bomb, which he called an “alarm clock”. The design proposed by him consisted of alternating spherical layers of fissile materials and thermonuclear fuel (deuterium, tritium, and possibly their chemical compounds). This system had a number of potential benefits. Fast neutrons produced during reactions in thermonuclear fuel layers should have caused fission in adjacent layers of fissile materials, which should have led to a noticeable increase in energy release. As a result of the ionization compression of a thermonuclear fuel in the course of an explosion, its density should have greatly increased and the rate of thermonuclear reactions would sharply increase. The need for non-equilibrium thermonuclear burning was absent, but a high-power atomic initiator was required. These requirements were all the more significant because from the “alarm clock” as a target alternative to the “classic super” it was necessary to obtain similar (megaton) power. In September 1947, E.Teller proposed the use of a new thermonuclear fuel - lithium-6 deuteride (6LiD). This should have led to a significant increase in the operating time of tritium in the process of an explosion and thereby significantly increase the efficiency of thermonuclear burning. However, the “alarm clock” project no longer seemed promising and promising, primarily because of the almost insurmountable problems of initiation.

It is difficult to say whether Teller A.D. Sakharov knew about these ideas when, in September-October 1948, he, analyzing alternative (with respect to the "pipe") hydrogen bomb schemes, came to a physically analogous scheme. Most likely did not know. Then he, an ordinary employee of Ya.B. Zeldovich’s group, did not have access to intelligence materials, and we know well how (and were able) to keep his mouth shut. In any case, researchers of the history of the Soviet thermonuclear project unanimously note the conceptual independence of the Sakharov developments. And Andrei Dmitrievich himself, organically incapable of lying (neither then nor later), emphasized his authorship on the development under discussion quite definitely. It remains once again to be surprised at how similar the solutions are to the most complicated problems of the same purpose in different countries, even in conditions of deep secrecy. It is curious that the aforementioned phenomenon of ionization compression of thermonuclear fuel, which is the physical basis of the operation of this device, is still known among Russian nuclear scientists as “saccharization”.

11.16.48 I.Ye.Tamm officially sent a letter to S.Vavilov, where he reported on the “fundamental possibility of achieving nuclear detonation of deuterium in a special device combining deuterium (or heavy water) with natural uranium-238” [italics mine. - A.K.]. More timely ideas then it was impossible to offer. Recall the colossal difficulties that the young Soviet atomic industry experienced in producing nuclear fuel for the first Soviet atomic bomb in those days, it was clear that even if it was successfully tested, it was the 235U and / or 239Pu weapons production that would be the limiting factor in the deployment of the Soviet nuclear potential, in any case, for the foreseeable time. And here it becomes possible to use cheap 238U as an effective nuclear material, in the production of weapons-grade uranium in general, considered as industrial waste!

The essence of the matter is as follows. In a conventional atomic bomb, 238U is not only useless (it is practically not divided by secondary neutrons), but also harmful, because in other nuclear reactions competing with fission, these “neutrons” are so eagerly needed for the development of the chain process. That is why the atomic bomb requires uranium of high (over 90%) enrichment. However, the situation changes dramatically when thermonuclear fusion neutrons hit the 238U layer, on average, almost 10 times more energetic than fission neutrons; At the same time, 238U divides beautifully, but the cost of obtaining each kiloton of power decreases many times over. Very tempting!

However, it is possible that these considerations began to play a role later, and then the new design, called the “puff”, was considered only in its original meaning - as a promising synthesis bomb scheme. Anyway, on January 20, 1949, A. Sakharov passed the first report on the “puff”, and on March 3, 1949, V.L. Ginzburg, in his report, proposed a new material - 6LiD, - ideally suited as a thermonuclear fuel. (Interestingly, at first, VL Ginzburg only wanted to increase the “saccharization” due to the neutron capture reaction 6Li. Only after reading the new data on the cross sections for fusion reactions in the Physical Review magazine dated 04.15.49, it became clear that the main value of 6LiD completely different.)

As already mentioned, because of the significantly higher cross section of the interaction of the nuclei, the deuterium – tritium mixture is ignited much easier than pure deuterium (for which E. Teller intended to use it as a basis for the initiating device “super”). But the price of such use would be the actual cessation of the production of weapons-grade plutonium, which no one in the United States would do. Moreover, it would not be realistic to focus on the rapid development of industrial production of tritium in the USSR, where even in the time being described, plutonium did not even have time to build up one bomb. In addition, tritium is very non-technological (it is still gas under normal conditions) and radioactive: with a half-life of 12.4 years, it turns into stable helium-3, one of the most “harmful” nuclides, intensively “devouring” precious neutrons without any benefits. This limits the life of the ammunition to several months. Of course, these difficulties are in principle surmountable (which the story subsequently proved), but at what cost and for how long ...

6LiD, a light white crystalline substance, is devoid of all these deficiencies and does not contain radionuclides and, most importantly, eagerly captures fission neutrons, turning into ... tritium, and deuterium is already at the ready! And here the main advantage of the "puff" comes into play. With correctly chosen construction parameters, due to the “saccharization” and the shock wave from the initiator explosion, a tremendous compression of the thermonuclear fuel is achieved. That's what the “super” and “pipe” lacked, that's when the direct road to the hydrogen bomb opens! Soviet nuclear scientists embarked on this path through the "puff". How E.Teller and his colleagues passed it below.

11.04.49 SI Vavilov officially informed L.P. Beria about the “puff”. 08.05.49 Yu.B. Khariton sent to B.Lannikov the conclusion of KB-11 on the “puff”, warmly supporting this project: “The basic idea of ​​the proposal is extremely witty and physically vivid”. On August 29, 1949, the first RDS-1 nuclear bomb was successfully tested - the most important event for the thermonuclear project, since it allowed the reorientation of a significant part of the scientific potential and production capacity of the PSU system. And the fuel to the fire, according to the classical canons of the arms race, was sharply added to the already mentioned Truman directive from 01/31/50. Already on the fourth day after it, the issue of the meeting “On measures to ensure development of the RDS-6” was considered at the meeting of the SC. In accordance with the decision of the Insurance Committee of 26.02.50, the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was adopted, which obliged PSU, Laboratory No. 2 of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and KB-11 to organize design-theoretical, experimental and design work on the creation of RDS-6s products (puff) and RDS- 6t ("pipe"). The first was to create an RDS-6s product weighing up to 5 tons with a TNT equivalent of 1 Mt. The resolution provided for the use of tritium not only in the design of the RDS-6t, but also in the design of the RDS-6s. The deadline for manufacturing the first copy of the RDS-6s product was set to 1954. Yu.B. Khariton was appointed research supervisor for both products, I.Ye.Tamm and Ya.B.Zeldovich were appointed as his deputies. In particular, by May 1, 1952, the RDS-6s product model with a small amount of tritium should be manufactured and its ground test should be carried out in June, and by October it should be submitted proposals on the design of a full-scale product. The Resolution prescribed the creation of a calculation-theoretical group in KB-11 for work on RDS-6s under the guidance of I.Ye. Tamm (later, in March 1950, ADSakharov and Yu.A.Romanov were included).

On the same day, February 26, 50, the USSR Council of Ministers Decree “On the Organization of Tritium Production” was adopted, and then other resolutions on the construction of a specialized heavy-water reactor for producing tritium and on the organization of 6LiD production. Subsequent events showed how far-sighted this last decision was. Nevertheless, it soon became clear that the deadlines were unreal. Not the last role in tightening the work played a continuation of research on the "pipe", although their futility began to emerge quite clearly. Be that as it may, the decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated 12.29.51. The directive period for testing the RDS-6s was postponed to March 1953, while continuing work on the RDS-6t as well (the latter were practically curtailed by the end of 1952). This was a direct consequence of the reaction of the top political leadership of the USSR to the first-ever test of the “Mike” thermonuclear explosive device, conducted by the United States on the Elugelab Atoll in the Pacific Ocean 11/01/52. Already on 02.12.52, L.P. Beria addressed the leaders of the PGU and I.V. Kurchatov with a note, which, in particular, said: “I.V.Kurchatov. The solution to the problem of creating RDS-6s is of paramount importance. Judging by some of the data that has come down to us, experiments were conducted in the USA related to this type of product [italics mine. - A.K.]. When departing with AP Zavenyagin in KB-11, hand over to Yu.B. Khariton, K.I. Shchelkin, N.L. Duhov, I.Ye.Tammu, A.D.Sakharov, Ya.B.Zeldovich, E. .I. Zababakhinu and N.N. Bogolyubov that every effort should be made to ensure the successful completion of research and development work related to RDS-6s. Give this also to LD Landau and A.N. Tikhonov. ”

This note is very curious. It testifies that “Mike” was associated by Beria not with a fundamentally new design of a thermonuclear explosive device (and he, as we shall see, was exactly that), but with a “puff” type design (and maybe "). And only Beria would have been good about this (in the end, he was a great organizer and a first-class executioner, but not a physicist), but the final authority, the theorists of KB-11, was also mistaken. L.P. Feoktistov, the future corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and designer of the first Soviet serial model of tactical nuclear weapons, and then a young employee of Ya.B. Zeldovich group, recalls: “In 1953 we<…>   were confident that<…>   We are not only catching up with the "puff", but even overtaking America.<…>   Of course, we already heard about the “Mike” test, but<…> at the time we thought that rich Americans blew up a "house with liquid deuterium"<…>   according to a scheme close to the “pipe” of Zeldovich.<…>   Only a few years ago [the cited quotation refers to 1998 — AK] I learned about the true purpose of the experience, its deep content ... ”.

However, the truth will clear up later. And then, in 1953, all available forces were thrown on the “puff” (as can be clearly seen from the note by L.P. Beria), it became “national pride”. Neither the death of Joseph Stalin (March 5, 53), or the arrest of Beria himself (July 4, 53) affected the frantic pace of work; work on the creation of new types of nuclear weapons have maintained the highest priority of the new political leadership of the country.

15.06.53 I.E.Tamm, A.D. Sakharov and Ya.B. Zeldovich signed the final report on the development of the RDS-6s. To increase the power of the bomb (which was extremely important both in the military-technical and in the political sense), the use of a certain amount of tritium was required at the last stage of product design (although, as mentioned above, 6LiD could be dispensed with). With this in mind, the design energy release was estimated to be 300 ± 100 kt. It is important to emphasize that it was a bomb suitable for combat use (and not a bulky stationary device, like "Mike"). 08/12/53 she was successfully tested on the tower of the Semipalatinsk test site. The fourth Soviet nuclear test was an outstanding achievement of Soviet defense science and technology, and the words of I. Kurchatov, with a deep bow to AD Sakharov: “Thank you, savior of Russia!” Were by no means an empty phrase.

The power of the RDS-6s bomb was 400 kilotons, which was no comparison with the tens of kilotons of HLM of the first generation division. She was the first in the world to deliver thermonuclear ammunition (TNFM); “Mike”, in which liquid deuterium was used as a thermonuclear fuel at a temperature close to absolute zero, really was a bulky device the size of a two-story house and weighing about 65 tons. At that time there were no other technological alternatives for Teller and Ulam, since industrial production of both tritium and 6LiD was established in the USA only after some time. "Puff" was the world's first thermonuclear explosive device, the design of which used 6LiD high enrichment of 6Li (there is little in natural lithium, only about 7.4%, the rest is 7Li). This made it possible, firstly, to drastically improve the manufacturability of the nuclear warhead production, and, secondly, to achieve a high accuracy of the prediction of the energy release of the newly constructed nuclear submersibles. That's where and when the foresight of the leadership of the Soviet thermonuclear project, which made the decision to manufacture this most important nuclear material in early 1950, affected it! Finally, the “puff” principle, in combination with the later discovered modern principles of tactical nuclear system, later allowed the construction of a TNT of practically unlimited capacity.

But it was the “puff” that opened the era of “dirty” bombs, combining high total power with a large specific energy release by fission. Recall that it is the fission reaction (not synthesis) that is the source of the most dangerous radionuclides, strontium-90 and cesium-137, which determine (depending on the type and power of the explosion) the local, regional or global radiation and radio-ecological situation. In the “puff”, the contribution of the synthesis reaction to the total energy release did not exceed 15–20%, which was close to the theoretical limit. Essentially, it was a 238U dividing bomb, only marginally enhanced by tritium and 6LiD. It is not by chance that her test of 12.07.53 (in addition, conducted in the most unfavorable from the point of view of radiation effects conditions — a ground explosion) was the cause of the strongest local and regional radioactive contamination: 82% strontium-90 fell on the landfill and the surrounding regions of Kazakhstan and Russia and 75% of cesium-137 of their total amount emitted into the atmosphere for the entire duration of the Semipalatinsk test site operation in general!

However, only a few thought about ecology. But doubts remained with the designers; and doubts are very serious. The main one was the practical impossibility, with a reasonable power of the atomic initiator, to achieve the megaton energy release according to the "puff" scheme - the TNBP was very cumbersome and clumsy (although, as we will see, the administrative movement to such "freaks" was undertaken at some point). At the same time, the colossal energy release in the explosion of “Mike” (10.4 Mt) was then already known to I.V. Kurchatov and his colleagues. An alarming question arose: how did the Americans manage to achieve this without regard to the compactness of the device?

There was no answer yet, and in these conditions it was decided to improve and further develop the “puff”. A.D. Sakharov about the last days of 1953: “... Malyshev summoned me [then the minister of Minsredmash. - AK] and asked<…>   state how I see the next generation product<…>   its principle of operation and approximate characteristics.<…>   I had an idea, not too original and successful, but at that moment it seemed<…>   promising.<…>   I wrote the required report.<…>   Two weeks later I was invited to a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU.<…>   The result of the meeting were two decisions.<…>   SM and the Central Committee of the CPSU. One of them [called "On the creation of a new type of powerful hydrogen bomb" from 11.20.53. - AK] obliged our Ministry [Minsredmash. - A.K.] in 1954-1955 to develop and test the product that I so carelessly announced.<…>   Other<…>   obliged missilemen to develop for this charge [marked with A.D. Sakharov font. - AK] intercontinental ballistic missile.<…>   Charge weight<…>   and the whole scale of the rocket was adopted based on my<…>   notes. This predetermined the work of a huge design and production organization [OKB S.P. Queen. - AK] for many years. It is this rocket [R-7, SS-6. - AK] put into orbit the first artificial earth satellite in 1957 and the ship with Yuri Gagarin in 1961 "

Interrupt for some time, AD Sakharov. It is easy to understand that we are talking here about the “puff” of the submegaton class (which received the RDS-6СД index in the above-mentioned decree), for the delivery of which to the target would really require all the power developed by the renowned Royal Seven by the fall of 1957. At the same time, work on the improvement of the “puff” also proceeded in other directions: first of all, along the way to reduce the cost of construction and improve its manufacturability. The result of this work was an experienced TNTF RDS-27, tested on 06.11.55 at the Semipalatinsk test site. At the cost of some reduction in power (about 250 kt) compared with the prototype RDS-6s, complete tritium was rejected, and in this form the product could, in principle, be put into service in the series. It should be noted that this was the first test in the world with the dumping of a TYAP from an aircraft (such as the Tu-16).

But then it was already clear that this would be a palliative solution. The “puff” in its original version has outlived its short century, and the decision of the USSR Council of Ministers on 19.07.55, which provided for the postponement of the RDS-6sD test (which did not take place), essentially only stated the state of affairs, but did not define any prospects. Too many major events occurred in a little over two years after her first triumph.

And now continues ADSakharov: “That charge [RDS-6sD. - AK], under which all this [the construction of the royal rocket. - AK] was done<…>   however, he managed to "evaporate", and something completely different took its place ... ".

What exactly?

The truth that came from the fog. Final (1954 - 1955)

03/01/54 at the Bikini Atoll in the Pacific, the American thermonuclear explosion exploded with unheard of power - 15 Mt! This explosion (“Bravo”), still the most powerful of all produced by the United States, has led to tragic consequences. Intensive radioactive fallouts covered the Japanese trawler Fukuryu-Maru, located at a distance of more than 200 km from Bikini. 23 fishermen who received a dose at the level of probably about 200 roentgens were forced to heal for a long time from acute radiation sickness, and one of them (radio operator of the trawler A.Kuboyama) died on 09/09/54 in a hospital, apparently from negative adverse effects of radiation.

Soviet nuclear scientists explosion "Bravo" plunged into shock. It became clear: in the competition for possession of US tactical nuclear forces, they took the lead, and the decisions that had to be made immediately should be the most significant and responsible for the entire nuclear race. The above-mentioned final rejection of the "pipe" followed. At one of the meetings in KB-11 with the participation of the company's management and all leading specialists I.Ye. Tamm demanded a categorical refusal not only from the "pipe", but also from the "national pride" - the "puff". L.P. Feoktistov, then a novice weapons designer, recalls: “In response to someone’s reply:“ Why so sharply? Let's develop the old and look for the new, ”followed<…>   I.E.Tamma's vigorous expression: “No, no. The man is conservative. If he leaves the old and entrust the new, he will only do the old. We have to announce tomorrow: “Comrades, nobody needs anything that you have done up to now. You are unemployed. ” I’m sure we will reach our goal in a few months. ” And the wise Tamm was right. ”

Now back to Los Alamos 4 years ago. To the credit of Teller and Ulam in the sadness about the death of the "super" (which was burdened and personal conflict), they did not last long. The fact that the creation of a bomb needed huge compression ratios of thermonuclear fuel, they are to the beginning of the 50s. understood no worse than Sakharov, Tamm and Zeldovich. But the great idea of ​​obtaining them came to Ulam when working in a slightly different area - increasing the efficiency of nuclear warhead fission by creating a two-stage bomb, when an explosion of an auxiliary plutonium charge causes an implosive compression of the main (also plutonium or uranium). But what if a circuit and a thermonuclear bomb were constructed in the same way: spatially separate the initiating (atomic) and energy releasing (thermonuclear) nodes and focus on the latter the mechanical energy and neutron flux from the initiator explosion? For such a focus, the shock wave must be properly guided through the surrounding material. Compression should be enormous.

But the real breakthrough was still to come. When Ulam at the beginning of 1951 announced this scheme to Teller (with whom he had managed to reconcile by that time), he offered his option, according to Ulam, “probably more convenient and general”: it is more convenient to compress a thermonuclear unit with non-mechanical energy and neutron flux, and radiation, emitted during the explosion of the initiator, for which it was necessary to take measures to ensure the greatest transparency for this radiation of the walls of the initiating node.

The joint report of Teller and Ulam from 03/09/51 essentially completed the history of the American TNW — a workable scheme was found. Another thing is that for its practical implementation it took almost two years of the most complicated design and engineering work, and only the test “Mike” on 01.11.52 drew a line under them.

But the American way from a stationary device to a transportable bomb turned out to be quite long; as we see more than a year. This was a direct consequence of the already mentioned delay in mastering the production of 6LiD. Only in May 1952, the construction of the 6Li plant began in Oak Ridge, and it was put into operation only in the middle of 1953. It is significant that even in the construction of the first American transportable TNBM (Bravo explosion already known to the reader) 03/01/54 ) 6LiD of relatively low enrichment was used (about 40%), and even LiD based on natural lithium (7.4% 6Li) was used in other trials of this series. Apparently, this was the reason for the large discrepancies between the calculated and true values ​​of the energy release of the first American TYBPs (two or more times), since the nuclear properties of 7Li were still not sufficiently studied. Probably, the problems with 6Li also played a role in the fact that the first test of the TYAP when they were dropped from the aircraft (Cherokee) in the USA was conducted only on May 21, 56 (in the USSR - 06/06/55). However, as we will see later, in the question of the “true”, two-stage, hydrogen bomb's aircraft test, Soviet gunsmiths overtook their American counterparts.

And then, in early 1954, they, as demanded by I.Ye. Tamm, became “unemployed” - in the sense that, having already thanks to the “pipe” and “puff”, an enormous methodical experience of thermonuclear research, conceptually turned out to be zero, knowing only that the “pipe” is hopeless, the “puff” is not very promising, and at the same time there is a way out (as shown by “Mike” and “Bravo”).

Already from the beginning of 1954, two-stage (with a spatial separation of the atomic initiator and energy-releasing thermonuclear unit) schemes of thermonuclear charges began to appear in KB-11. The first of them, as is not difficult to see, were an attempt to implement the idea of ​​Ulam on the material compression of thermonuclear fuel. A characteristic feature of these schemes was the use of several initiators for the maximum compression ratio of a thermonuclear knot - from two in the razor scheme by D.A. Frank-Kamenetsky to 12 - 16 in A. Zavenyagin's candelabrum. Even he, a purely administrative head of a very high rank, at the time described, the deputy minister (and later the minister) Minsredmash found it necessary and appropriate to contribute to the common efforts, although the candelabrum was considered in KB-11 only as an engineering curiosity, and Of course, Zavenyagin himself did not pretend to anything. His main task was not the creation of a new design, but the maintenance in the team of a completely unique “brainstorming” environment, similar to which in KB-11 was neither before nor after the described events.

The author is inclined to agree with those eyewitnesses who associate this situation with the fresh winds of the coming Khrushchev “thaw”. Although, of course, no one canceled strict regime requirements, it was thought that it was going on and breathing much easier than in the times of Beria and Meshik. Formally, at that time in KB-11 there were two theoretical departments (Sakharov and Zeldovich), however, according to L.P. Feoktistov, they were separated only by “payroll payroll”. Everything was done together, in concert and in the highest degree effective. A powerful team of like-minded people appeared.

After a very short time, it became clear that any scheme of mechanical compression initially characterized by cumbersome and poor physical efficiency. We had to look for something else - and the decision came. However, the specific circumstances of its appearance are perhaps the most mysterious page in the history of the Soviet thermonuclear project. To illustrate this idea, I will quote with minimal comments excerpts from the memoirs of the participants in the creation of the first Soviet "real" thermonuclear bomb, describing this episode.

G.A.Goncharov: “A new compression mechanism<…>   the secondary thermonuclear knot by the radiation energy of the primary atomic bomb was discovered. It happened in March-April 1954. ”

Yu.B. Khariton, V.B. Adamsky, Yu.N.Smirnov: “... once Zeldovich, bursting into the room of young theorists G.M.Gandelman and V.B. Adamsky, who was against his office, joyfully exclaimed:“ It’s necessary to do wrong, we will release radiation from the ball charge! ””.

L.P. Feoktistov: “Rumor attributed these fundamental thoughts<…>   then Ya.B. Zeldovich, then AD Sakharov, then both, then someone else, but always in some indefinite form: it seems, it seems, and the like.<…>   I was well acquainted with Ya.B. Zeldovich. But I have never heard from him a direct confirmation on this account (as, incidentally, from Sakharov) ”.

A.D. Sakharov (who in his memoirs called the concept of radiation reduction of a thermonuclear knot a “third idea”): “Apparently, several employees of our theoretical departments simultaneously came to the“ third idea ”. One of them was me. It seems to me that I already at an early stage understood the basic physical and mathematical aspects of the “third idea”. Because of this<…>   my role in accepting and implementing the “third idea” may have been one of the decisive ones. But also, undoubtedly, the role of Zeldovich, Trutnev and others was very large and, perhaps, they understood and anticipated the prospects and difficulties of the “third idea” no less than I did. At that time, we (in any case) had no time to think about the issues of priority<…>   and in retrospect it is impossible to restore all the details of the discussions, and is it necessary? .. ”

The stinging comment of another participant of the events, V.Ritus, is quite logical in this connection: “When setting forth the appearance of the“ third idea ”in four phrases, A.D. Sakharov four times uses the words“ apparently ”,“ it seems to me ”,“ perhaps ”,“ Maybe ”, but never calls the specific individuals who have expressed the“ third idea ”, and rather speaks about their understanding of this idea. Andrei Dmitrievich for some reason considers it impossible or impossible to answer priority questions. Why did it happen?" . And G.A. Goncharov adds (and also quite rightly): “We note that at the same time, A.D. Sakharov clearly speaks of his priority and V.L.Ginzburg, when it comes to“ first ”and“ second ” ideas are puffs and using 6LiD. ”

It should be emphasized once again: all the statements quoted above regarding the “third idea” belong not to historians and not to journalists, but to the direct participants of the events. With this in mind, I present the reader the right to formulate his own opinion.

Direct evidence on the use of intelligence at this stage of the author does not have (frankly biased and technically illiterate publications do not count). And in this case, even seemingly quite definite opinions can be interpreted ambiguously, perhaps even contrary to this opinion. Here is a good example. L.P. Feoktistov: “Evaluating that period and the influence of the American“ factor ”on our development, I can quite definitely say that we did not have drawings or accurate data received from outside. But we were not the same as in the times of Fuchs and the first atomic bomb, but much more understanding, prepared for the perception of hints and half hints [emphasis added. - A.K.]. I do not leave the feeling that at that time we were not completely independent. ”

It seems that everything is clear ... But let's pay attention to the words about "understanding and trained" experts! In the brainstorming atmosphere described above, when the decision was almost visibly hanging in the air, it was enough for someone to quit, for example, in passing or even accidentally, only three words: “compression by the initiator radiation” - everything would immediately become clear to everyone ! The long-term experience of thermonuclear research, multiplied by an unprecedented atmosphere of creative search, was not in vain. And these three words could come not even from Sakharov, Zeldovich or Tamm, but from a nameless physicist, mathematician or engineer of KB-11, that would be enough.

It could have been different, of course ... LP Feoktistov about his trip to the Livermore National Laboratory (one of the two main centers for developing nuclear weapons in the United States) in the second half of the 1990s: “They told me one story, which was hotly debated in America and almost unknown<…>   in Russia. Shortly after the “Mike” test on the train<…>   Dr. Wheeler was transporting a top-secret document on the latest nuclear device. By unknown<…>   document reasons disappeared - it was left unattended in the toilet for a few minutes [! - A.K.]. Despite all the measures taken - the train was stopped, all passengers were inspected, the sides of the railway were inspected - the document was not found. To my direct question: was it possible to get information on the technical details and the device as a whole through the document? - I received an affirmative answer.

The story is, of course, exciting. However, people who are familiar with the rules of storage, use, transportation and transfer of secret documentation (not to mention the "top secret"), it can cause only a fit of laughter, no matter how "hot" it is "discussed". It can be assumed that only a sense of delicacy prevented LPPeoktistov, who perfectly knows these rules, from reacting to the “creepy” story in precisely this way. But if we leave aside jokes and put the question seriously (albeit naively): could the “third idea” be the fruit of intelligence efforts? - the answer is only one thought: of course, it could, and the task of intelligence here was extremely simplified, since The result of her work in this case could not even be drawings or secret reports, but the same three “magic” words, as in Pushkin’s The Queen of Spades.

However, there is still talk about “theft of secrets” when creating tactical nuclear weapons, and now we will return to KB-11. The results of intensive work in 1954 on the creation of a thermonuclear charge of a new design were discussed on November 24, 1954 at a meeting of the Scientific and Technical Council of the KB-11 chaired by I. Kurchatov. And on 03.02.55, the development of a technical specification for the design of an experimental thermonuclear charge on a new principle, which received the name RDS-37, was completed. By that time, the decisive stage of its theoretical calculation was completed. However, theoretical design and refinement of the RDS-37 design continued until the final assembly and shipment of the product to the landfill.

06/25/55 a report was issued on the design choice and theoretical calculation of the RDS-37 charge, and the thirty-one KB-11 employees who signed it were forever included in the latest technological history. And on 22.11.55 at 9 h 47 min at the Semipalatinsk proving ground at an altitude of 1500 m (the carrier is a Tu-16 aircraft, the crew commander is Colonel of the USSR Air Force FP Golovashko, who was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for this flight) The first Soviet two-stage thermonuclear bomb. Its design capacity was about 3.6 Mt, however, to reduce the more than likely serious damage outside the landfill, it was deliberately (by replacing part 6LiD with passive material) reduced to half of the nominal and amounted to about 1.7 Mt. This was the first case in the world of a planned reduction in the energy release of a TNGMP, which once again confirmed the high reliability of its prediction methods developed by Soviet nuclear scientists. Tritium in the design of the RDS-37 was not used, as well as (unlike the Bravo explosion) the increase in energy release due to 238U. This latter circumstance, in combination with a significant height of the explosion, has dramatically reduced the radiation effects of the test.

But even with a half-time energy release, the RDS-37 "has done things." In the villages lying at a distance of 60-70 km from the epicenter of the explosion, part of the houses were destroyed, and the loss of glazing in the windows was noted even in the city of Semipalatinsk (175 km) and further down to 350 km. Unfortunately, people have suffered. In one of the villages, 60 km away from the epicenter, a three-year-old girl died when the ceiling collapsed. In one of the wait-and-see areas for personnel (36 km from the epicenter), as a result of the collapse of the trench, six soldiers guarding the landfill were covered with earth, and one of them died from suffocation. Twenty-six people in the countryside and sixteen in the city of Semipalatinsk were slightly injured by glass fragments and fragments of buildings.

Although after the test, an explanation was found for such an anomalous, almost 5 times higher than predictive values, impact of the shock wave (a rare combination of wind and temperature distributions over height, under conditions of which the shock wave “presses” to the ground), it would be clear: carrying out such explosions Semipalatinsk test site is unsuitable. In the future, all tests of the megaton class were conducted only at the Novaya Zemlya test site.

There were still many glorious pages in the development of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons. In 1957, in the newly organized second nuclear weapons design enterprise (Chelyabinsk-70, now RFNC VNIITF, Snezhinsk), the first Soviet serial TNT was created (designers - E.I. Zababakhin, Yu.A.Romanov and L. P.Feoktistov). By 1958, in the course of the work of Yu.N. Babayev and Yu.A. Trutnev, an important improvement was introduced into the scheme of the Soviet TNBM, which predetermined their modern appearance. And by the mid-60s. The venerable gunsmiths G.A.Goncharov and I.A. Kurilov (who worked on the RDS-37) together with the young theorists V.V. Pinaev and V.N. Mikhailov (the future minister of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of Russia) created the TNBP with very high specific characteristics. Since then, parity has come in the design of nuclear weapons between the USSR and the USA.

But all this was only a development of the principle, first implemented in the design of the RDS-37. In the area of ​​fundamental ideas and concepts that formed the basis of TNW, the nuclear race was essentially over.

Once again about the "theft of nuclear secrets"

Returning to the role of intelligence in the Soviet thermonuclear project, three groups of episodes can be distinguished. The first one contains documented facts of the availability of intelligence information on certain issues - let us recall Beria’s order to familiarize himself with those of a strictly limited circle of leading experts. The second one unites events where the influence of intelligence seems to be implicit - in the sense that it is not directly documented, but in the general context of events it looks almost certain. This mainly concerns decision making at the level of the country's political leadership; According to the author, it is this aspect of the activities of the Soviet intelligence on a thermonuclear project that was most important. Finally, a vivid example of the events of the third group is the “idea from fog” of 1954 about radiation implosion as the main principle of operation of a thermonuclear bomb. In them, the role of intelligence is estimated, in general, by the same words as the description of the events: “probably”, “apparently”, “not excluded”, “seems”, “like”, etc. Here everyone has the right on your point of view. In general, in the history of a thermonuclear project, like the earlier atomic one, intelligence was a very important and active player in the team, and its role in fully understandable disagreements in the assessment of particulars should not be exaggerated, not downplayed, and even more so to bring any of these approaches to logical absolutization.

In this regard, it is difficult to pass by two views on the role of intelligence in the creation of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons, which, surprisingly, have a wide circulation in the West. They are closely interrelated and provide a vivid example of how conceptual delusion entails a private, technical delusion. A conceptual fallacy that has become equally widespread among both American scientists and politicians, was aptly formulated by the famous American physicist R. Lepp: this is the "tacit assumption that in order to have a weapon, the enemy must steal secrets." The question was how to interpret this kind of axiomatic premise in relation to the history of the creation of tactical nuclear weapons. In H. Bete's wording, it sounds like this: “... by virtue of<…>   the random nature of the discovery by Ulam and Teller of a workable hydrogen bomb scheme would be an incredible coincidence if the Russian project went along the same path. ” Well, since the Russians nevertheless went “in a similar way” (although there is an interesting question, which is lower), how they managed to “steal secrets” - given that the information from K. Fuchs was rather misleading. What helped?

Who seeks will always find. The Americans also "found", but the answer was incorrect. Yes, and he had little chance of being correct, because the initial formulation of the question was incorrect. To begin with, the premise about the "random character" of the discovery of Ulam and Teller and about the "incredible coincidence" of the same, but independent, in the USSR, is very doubtful. If in both countries, at approximately the same level of development of relevant technologies, huge efforts are being made to rank with the highest state priorities to solve the same large-scale scientific and technical problem, then the likelihood of major discoveries in this area increases dramatically - examples in world history very much. It would be strange to look for the machinations of the special services in the discovery of the planet Neptune Le Verrier and Adams, in the parallel development of the foundations of the differential calculus by Newton and Leibniz, in the independent initial formulation of quantum mechanics by Schrödinger and Heisenberg, etc.

And now about the American answer to the question “who stole it?”. In view of the fact that Fuchs’s candidacy “disappeared” (although not everyone understands this in the United States), the charge of “espionage activities” was brought<…> radioactive fallout from the “Mike” explosion, the selection and subsequent analysis of which allegedly gave Soviet nuclear scientists the crucial information on radiation implosion as the main principle of the “real” hydrogen bomb. The list of top scientists and experts sticking to this still widely used version is literally amazing. These include R. Oppenheimer, H. Bete, and V. Bush, and the former director of the Livermore National Laboratory, G. York, and others.

But this is not so - and this is confirmed by the absolutely agreed comments of this version from all the leading Soviet thermonuclear fighters. Yu.B. Khariton most definitely expressed himself: “... organization of work [on sampling and analysis of samples. - AK] at that time, we were still at an insufficiently high level and there were no useful results ... ”; “... radiochemical analysis of samples in principle could not give any information about the actual design [italics mine. - A.K.] of this device. LP Feoktistov, who, as we have seen, cannot be accused of hurray-patriotism, is equally unequivocally expressed on this issue.

The author, for several years professionally engaged in the analysis of radioactivity in environmental samples, should confirm the correctness of Russian nuclear scientists. Indeed, in some cases, the composition of these samples can make certain conclusions about the parameters of the tested charge. Thus, the presence of 7Ве and an increased concentration of tritium indicates the presence of thermonuclear energy release, 237U - about the use of a 238U charge (three-stage TNBP) in the design. For certain combinations of technogenic radionuclides, it is possible to approximately estimate the power of the device, the relative contribution of energy released by fission and synthesis, the nature of the test, sometimes the composition of the atomic initiator and something else. But it is really impossible to restore the charge structure from these data.

The point is that the problem under discussion belongs to the class of the so-called inverse (or incorrect), very unloved by mathematicians and, unlike the direct ones, often not having unambiguous solutions. In other words, following some rather complicated recipe, it is relatively easy to cook a delicious sauce using a variety of ingredients (a direct task). But it is much more difficult, if possible at all, to determine by the sauce test, without knowing the recipe, the composition of ingredients, the preparation mode, and at the same time the construction of the plate on which it was prepared (the inverse problem).

The analogy with the analysis of fallout from nuclear tests is quite close. According to the results of this analysis, it was possible - at least in principle and in any case, when the sampling and analysis methods were worked out (which, as we have seen, the USSR did not have) - to conclude that the compression ratio of thermonuclear fuel is extremely high, because the huge neutron densities streams in this case "impose an imprint" on their composition. But we have already seen that the need to achieve such compression from the beginning of the 50s. was not a secret for Sakharov, Zeldovich and their colleagues. But how to achieve this - the analysis of samples in principle could not answer this question, and it was he who was the main, decisive.

It is curious that, proving the presence of so-called secret sources of information among Soviet atomic scientists, D. Hirsch and W. Matthews repeatedly mentioned in this article unwittingly gave their presence ... to themselves. L.P. Feoktistov: “Inspired by the authors, in their striving to prove the fact of borrowing, they give arguments, of which there is absolutely certain [italics mine. - AK] something very important follows. Namely: there is no difference between the American and Russian hydrogen bombs, they are twins in construction and technical data ... Direct confirmation, one can say, is official. ” Commenting on this idea, L.P. Feoktistova, Director and Scientific Director of RFNC-VNIITF (formerly Chelyabinsk-70), the largest Russian nuclear weapons expert, Academician E.N. Aurorin reasonably remarks: “I wonder how did D. Hirsch and U . Matthews? There are a lot of legends about this among the developers of nuclear weapons. According to one of them, the United States raised<…>   the compartment of the accident [in 1968 - А.К.] submarine [К-129. - А.К.], in which the nuclear warheads were located. If the conclusion of D. Hirsch and U. Matthews is based on<…>   this operation, then the developers of modern nuclear weapons, he calls a smile. "

However, the question of E.N. Aurorin, most likely, will hang in the air, like many other, very interesting questions on the problem under discussion. This, of course, can be regretted, but what will change? The picture of the history of the creation of tactical nuclear weapons, the most destructive weapons of modern times, “doomsday machines”, can only, perhaps, be written in general, broad strokes, knowing for sure that some pages (it is possible that very important ones) will not become parts of this picture never.

Literature

1. Koldobsky AB Soviet atomic project. To the history of the creation of the atomic bomb. - Physics, № 28, 31/98.
  2. Jung R. Brighter than a thousand suns. - M .: Atomizdat, 1960, p. 190.
3. Kapitsa P.L. About science and power. - M .: Science, 1990, p. 39
  4.Timerbaev R. About the attitude of Academician Kapitsa and some other Soviet scientists to the atomic project, to the atomic bomb and to the control over it. - Nuclear Control, 1998, № 1, vol. 37, p. 62.
  5. Khariton Yu.B., Adamsky V.B., Smirnov Yu.N. On the creation of the Soviet hydrogen (thermonuclear) bomb. - UFN, 1996, t. 166, № 2, p. 201
  6. Goncharov G.A. The main events in the history of the creation of the hydrogen bomb in the USSR and the USA. - UFN, 1996, t. 166, № 10, p.1095.
  7. Goncharov G.A. To the history of the creation of the Soviet hydrogen bomb. - UFN, 1997, t. 167, № 8, p. 903.
  8. Adamsky V.B., Smirnov Yu.N. Once again about the creation of the Soviet hydrogen bomb. - UFN, 1997, t. 167, № 8, p. 899.
  9. Gurevich I.I., Zeldovich Ya.B., Pomeranchuk I.Ya., Khariton Yu.B. The use of nuclear energy of light elements. - UFN, 1991, t. 161, № 5, p. 171.
  10. Gershtein S.S. From the memories of Ya.B. Zeldovich. - UFN, 1991, t. 161, № 5, p. 170
  11. Feoktistov L.P. From the past to the future. - Snezhinsk: RFNC-VNIITF, 1998, p. 23.
  12. Hirsch D., Matthews W. Hydrogen bomb: who gave her the secret? - UFN, 1991, t. 161, № 5, p. 153. (Trans. From English.) The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist (January / February), 1990.
  13. Feoktistov L.P. Hydrogen bomb: who gave her a secret? - Scientific and Methodological Bulletin of the Nuclear Society of Russia, No. 3, 4/97, p. 62.
  14. Dubasov Yu.A., Zelentsov S.A. Chronology of atmospheric nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk test site and their radiation characteristics. - Bulletin of the Center for Atomic Energy, 1996, No. 6, p. 39
  15. Sakharov A. Memories. - New York: publishing them. A.P. Chekhov, with. 241.
  16. Lapp R. Atoms and people. - M .: IIL, 1959, p. 132.
  17. See, p. 109.
  18. Ritus V.I. If not me, then who? - Nature, 1990, vol. 8, No. 10, p. 265.
  19. See, p. 31.
  20. Semipalatinsk polygon. From the series “Nuclear Testing in the USSR”. - M .: 1997, p. 129.
  21. Bomb two. - M .: IzdAt, 1994, p. eleven.
  22. See, p. 161.
  23. Khariton Yu.B., Smirnov Yu.N. Myths and reality of the Soviet nuclear project. - Arzamas-16: 1994, p. ten.
  24. See, p. 110.
  25. See, p. 68

His ambiguous fate reflected the complexity of modern history: he developed the most terrible weapon and received the Nobel Peace Prize.

Between the world and science?

RDS-6s is the name of the first hydrogen bomb created in the Soviet Union. The development was led by Andrei Sakharov and Yuly Khariton. The Fire Mushroom was first seen on the Semipalatinsk test site on August 12, 1953. For this work, Sakharov received the title of academician and Hero of Socialist Labor.

The scientist himself said: “We proceeded from the fact that this work is practically a war for peace. We worked with great tension, with great courage ... Over time, my position changed in many ways, I overestimated a lot, but still I do not repent of this initial period of work, in which I actively participated with my comrades ... that, in general, progress is a movement necessary in the life of mankind. He creates new problems, but he also resolves them ... I hope that this critical period of human history will be overcome by humanity. This is a kind of exam that humanity holds. Exam on the ability to survive. "

Do I need to repent?

Viktor Astafyev wrote about Sakharov: “Having created a weapon that would burn the planet, he did not repent. Such a little trick - to die a hero, having committed a crime. "
  Ales Adamovich believed that Andrei Sakharov’s public activity was his peculiar repentance to the world, but the scientist himself never recognized this: “Today, thermonuclear weapons have never been used against people in a war. My most passionate dream (deeper than anything else) is for this to never happen, for thermonuclear weapons to contain war, but never to be used. ”

Is it only a bomb?

In addition to working on the hydrogen bomb, Sakharov proved his scientific viability by the fact that he is the author of the theory of baryon asymmetry of the Universe, induced by a bent. Andrei Dmitrievich was engaged in magnetic hydrodynamics, plasma physics, elementary particles. He did not look like an evil genius, rather like a man completely immersed in science, whom everyday, everyday life touches little. One of his collaborators, Yu. N. Smirnov, writes in his memoirs: “He was seen in shoes belonging to different pairs. Once at the training ground he surprised many people with a large round neckline on one of his shoes. The explanation turned out to be unexpectedly simple: the leg was unbearably stinging and Andrei Dmitrievich had to use scissors ... "

Can a signature help?

Andrei Dmitrievich was one of those who signed the letter on behalf of a group of Soviet scientists. Now it is known as the "Letter of the Three Hundred." This appeal was sent to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on October 11, 1955.

Scientists who dropped the signature were worried about the state of biology in the country. The letter became the starting point for the end of “Lysenkoism”: D. Lysenko and his associates were dismissed from leadership positions associated with the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. So scientists have proven that they, and not just politicians, can be a force.

Causes of opals?

Sakharov, in addition to scientific work, was known for his human rights activities. In June 1968, his article “Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom” appeared abroad. In it, he expressed concerns regarding the dehumanization of humanity and crimes against freedom. He called for the abolition of censorship and political courts, he condemned the trials of dissidents.

As a result, Sakharov was dismissed from work and dismissed from all posts.

What gave the Nobel Peace Prize?

On October 9, 1975, Sakharov was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The formulation was as follows: "For the fearless support of the fundamental principles of peace between people and the courageous struggle against the abuse of power and any form of suppression of human dignity." His Nobel lecture was called “Peace, Progress, Human Rights”. In it, Sakharov said the following: “It is important that only in an atmosphere of intellectual freedom is an effective educational system and creative continuity of generations possible. On the contrary, intellectual non-freedom, the power of dull bureaucracy, conformism, destroying first the humanitarian fields of knowledge, literature and art, then inevitably lead to a general intellectual decline, bureaucratization and formalization of the entire education system, to the decline of scientific research, the disappearance of the atmosphere of creative search, stagnation and disintegration ".

Communication with the CIA?

For many years there has been controversy over whether Sakharov was an agent of CIA influence. Copies of declassified documents are given. For example, the analytical note "Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn: the Soviet dilemma", dated September 26, 1973. It says that Sakharov was able to "transform his fate into an international problem" and, with his publications, helped trigger a reaction that challenged the "Soviet policy of detente."

Academician Dmitry Likhachev said about Sakharov: “He was a real prophet. The prophet in the ancient, primordial sense of the word, that is, a man who calls his contemporaries to moral renewal for the future. And, like any prophet, he was not understood and was expelled from his people. "