A commonplace banality was the claim that the Soviet Union would never have been able to create atomic and thermonuclear weapons without the help of our intelligence officers. With regard to modern media coverage of the problem, they brought to the country top-secret documents on the work of the relevant devices, if not cars, then certainly suitcases. "Our" TV reporters persistently repeat the display of the former secret documents and drawings with the "acquaint" resolutions. According to journalists, the Soviet “lapotniki” could only read these documents and copy the products.

It is not entirely clear why these insinuations are not adequately resisted by those who, by occupation, would seem to be the easiest to do, namely, the participants in these works. It cannot be said that they do not write at all, but their presentation is always some kind of shy, unsaid. This is especially true of the thermonuclear bomb history. Now, due to the declassification of many documents, it has become possible to clearly and clearly show who stole what and who.

Nuclear Reactor and Nuclear Bomb

Unlike conventional explosives, a nuclear bomb is stuffed with a radioactive substance, for example, U-235, which constantly "smolders", some of the atoms of this substance spontaneously break up into fragments, releasing a huge amount of energy. While this substance is small, fragments and released heat are radiated out. But when a certain mass, called critical, is reached, particles (neutrons) produced by spontaneous decay get into neighboring atoms, which under their blows now have to decay, release additional energy and new neutrons. This is the nuclear chain reaction. If the critical mass is reached slowly and under control, and the energy released is converted into heat and removed, then this device is called a nuclear reactor. In a bomb to get an explosion, the supercritical mass is obtained by quickly combining several subcritical pieces by compressing them with the blasting of ordinary explosives.

By 1942, by the year of the launch of a nuclear reactor in the United States, all the discoveries necessary to create atomic and thermonuclear bombs in the world had been made. And not only made, but also published. We open the textbook - "The course of general chemistry" - Dr. of Sc. B.V. Nekrasov, published in 1945 (handed over to production on January 15, 1945, before conducting a nuclear charge test in the USA), and p. 951 we read: “Studying the process of interaction of uranium with neutrons led to the discovery of a completely new way of decay - nuclear fission into two more or less equal parts (Gan and Strassmann, 1939). Such a division (later also found for thorium, protactinium and ionium nuclei) is especially characteristic of the U-235 isotope and occurs as a result of its absorption by a slowly moving neutron. It is very important that it is accompanied not only by the formation of two new "fragmentation" nuclei, but also by the emission of neutrons (on average, two for each division), which can, in turn, cause the division of neighboring U-235 nuclei. Thus, it becomes fundamentally possible spontaneous continuation of the once begun process.

Since nuclear fission occurs with an enormous energy effect, the process in question opens up the most realistic at present prospects for the practical use of intra-atomic energy. However, on this way there are significant technical difficulties associated with the need to pre-enrich large quantities of uranium with the relatively rare U-235 isotope. ” And then in small print.

“To ensure uninterrupted fission, the mass of uranium used must be very large (on the order of tons), since only under these conditions a sufficient likelihood of neutrons entering the nucleus is created. As mentioned earlier, the U-235 content in conventional uranium is only 0.55%. Meanwhile, even according to the most effective method of isotope separation using thermal diffusion, it will take 6-7 times to work a specially designed installation to enrich 5 g of UF6 with a light isotope 6-7 times. ”

Having only this description and a sufficient amount of uranium, it is already possible to begin to design a nuclear reactor and a bomb. But no one gave us a single gram of uranium, and it didn’t require grams, but tons and tons. In addition to uranium, ultrapure graphite, heavy water, structural materials, and much, much more were needed. We ourselves mined all of this, enriched it, developed the technology, measured it, checked it and started the reactor. The clear organization and selfless work of not only scientists who deservedly enjoy fame, but also thousands of unknown workers, engineers, technologists and designers ensured success. Yes, the scouts did their bit, but she was a small part of a big deal. And we must not forget that this was the time after the just-ended most destructive war for our country. Not everyone wanted to think about a bomb, but about restoring a destroyed economy. Instead, in order not to tempt Americans to repeat the procedure for appeasing Moscow and our other cities, as they did in Japan with Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we had to come to grips with creating our own weapons, which were successfully tested in 1949. This is a brief history of a nuclear bomb in which no one is called the “father” of this bomb: neither American nor Soviet. They call technical and scientific managers of works: Americans - General L.R. Grove and the scientist D.R. Oppenheimer and Soviet - L.P. Beria and I.V. Kurchatov. That's because no one in the creation of a nuclear bomb made a significant or fundamental contribution in comparison with the other participants. These were the fruits of collective labor, someone more, someone less.

Hydrogen bomb "daddy"

Another thing - the hydrogen bomb. Here there are already her “dads”, the American - E. Teller, the Soviet - A. Sakharov. Let compatriots write about an American, we are more interested in our own. “The role of this great man - a talented physicist, a citizen of the world - in the profound changes taking place in our country is unusually great. His name belongs to the story. But the time for a comprehensive analysis of A.D. Sakharov (and we have no doubt that such an analysis will be carried out) is still ahead. ” The speeches of Sakharov, an active member of the “Interregional Group” of the Congress of People's Deputies - the destroyers of the Soviet Union, were widely covered by the media. His real participation in the creation of the hydrogen bomb is less well known.

“AD is considered the father of the hydrogen bomb in the Soviet Union. Sakharov. Among the creators of the atomic and hydrogen bombs in the first rank are also the names of I.V. Kurchatov (supervisor of nuclear programs), I.E. Tamm, Yu.B. Khariton, Ya.B. Zeldovich, K.I. Shchelkina, E.I. Zababakhin.

Recall that after the end of World War II, the former allies were again on different sides of the barricades and not through the fault of the USSR. “Shortly after Hiroshima, military strategists in Washington began to reflect on how to use atomic bombs against the Soviet Union. The very first list of targets for the atomic attack was prepared on November 3, 1945. " As a result of the war, the USSR gained great international prestige, a developed military industry and allies in Europe and Asia. The United States acquired the same, plus a huge industrial potential and an atomic bomb. In 1947, US Secretary of State J. Marshall came forward with a plan to restore the main industries in Europe and the USSR, provided that these countries pledged to promote the development of "free enterprise", i.e. encourage private US investments that would be controlled by the United States. 16 Western European countries, mainly future NATO countries, have signed an agreement. I.V. Stalin did not agree to such conditions of cooperation. The confrontation was aggravated by the fact that the ideas of national independence were supported by the peoples of not only the colonial countries, but also the European capitalist ones. And only the Soviet Union was on the path of the United States to world hegemony. The successful testing of the Soviet nuclear bomb established the military parity of the rival parties, which did not suit America at all.

On January 31, 1950, US President G. Truman issued a statement that instructed the Atomic Energy Commission to "continue to work on all types of atomic weapons, including the so-called hydrogen or superbomb." For the Soviet government, this turn of events was not a surprise.

Discussions and theoretical work in the United States on the hydrogen bomb have been conducted before, since work began on a nuclear bomb. In March 1948, K. Fuchs, a theorist and one of the developers of the American hydrogen bomb, met with our resident in London, “during which he handed materials for the USSR that were of paramount importance. Among these materials was a new theoretical material related to the superbomb. ... As a primary atomic bomb, a cannon-type bomb based on uranium-235 with a beryllium oxide reflector was used. The secondary node was a liquid DT mixture. ... The initiating compartment adjoined a long cylindrical vessel with liquid deuterium. " In this scheme, it was assumed that an exploded nuclear bomb heats the mixture of deuterium with tritium to a temperature of several million degrees, which will cause a thermonuclear reaction.

The power of the hydrogen bomb explosion is limited only by the possibility of its transportation. The fact is that liquid deuterium and tritium (their temperature is close to absolute zero) require special storage. They are placed in a cryostat, a vessel with double walls, between which there is a vacuum, this vessel is immersed in liquid helium in the same cryostat, which in turn is immersed in a similar vessel with liquid nitrogen. Liquefied gases evaporate, they must be captured and cooled again. Requires cryogenic technology and its continuous maintenance. “It was discussed, for example, that a bomb, disguised, would be delivered on a ship to the shores of America and they would blow it up, destroying half of the country. (Compare the discussion of a similar proposal given in Sakharov’s book, which AD Sakharov conducted with Rear Admiral F. Fomin. The reaction of F. Fomin is interesting: "We, the sailors, do not fight with the civilian population") ".

“On June 10, 1948, the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR obliged the design bureau under the direction of Yu.B. Khariton conduct a data check on the feasibility of ... hydrogen bomb. ... In June of the same year, a special group of the LPI of the USSR consisting of I.E. Tamm, S.Z. Belenky and A.D. Sakharova began work on the problem of deuterium nuclear combustion. The group soon included V.L. Ginzburg and Yu.A. Romanov.

Here it is appropriate to present some biographical data of A. Sakharov. He was born in 1921, in 1938 he entered Moscow University, in 1942 he graduated from his studies in Ashgabat, where he was evacuated with the university, and was distributed to the plant in Kovrov. In 1945, enters the graduate school to I.E. Tamm. Here is what VB writes. Adamsky about Tamm and his relationship with Sakharov: “... I.E. Tamm, a sharp man, impulsive, intolerant of any falsehood and incapable of any conformism, had, as it seems to me, a great influence as a teacher and citizen on Andrei Dmitrievich at the beginning of his journey. ”

At the end of January 1950, “Klaus Fuchs dictates and signs a statement in the London War Ministry, admitting that he passed on top-secret information in the USSR on the design of nuclear weapons developed at the Los Alamos laboratory during the war and soon after. Just four days after Fuchs’s written recognition (1/31/1950), President Harry Truman sent a directive to the Atomic Energy Commission of the United States to resume work on the superbomb program. ... In less than a month since Truman’s directive on the hydrogen bomb program was discovered, it was discovered that almost all the more or less important assumptions about the hydrogen bomb design accepted by this time and known to Fuchs were wrong. Mr. Bethe (head of the theoretical department of the Los Alamos lab.) Wrote: “If the Russians really started their thermonuclear program based on exactly the information that they received from Fuchs, then their program also had to fail. ... After the start of serious work on it (superbomb) and as a chain of "random" events that occurred a long time after Fuchs left Los Alamos, led to a completely new concept of thermonuclear weapons, now known as the Teller hydrogen bomb Ulama. Soviet physicists were not aware of the conclusions of G. Bethe. November 1, 1952, the United States conducted a test of a thermonuclear device with liquid deuterium TNT equivalent of about 10 million tons. The design of this device is not declassified so far, so even its weight is indicated by different authors. Yu.B. Khariton calls - 65 tons, and B.D. Bondarenko - 80 tons. But they agree on one thing, the device is a huge laboratory building the size of a two-story house, it is difficult to transport, that is, it was not a bomb.

Who is father

About a month after the directive of the President of the United States, work in the USSR is being forced. On February 26, 1950, the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the work on the creation of the RDS-6" (RDS-6 - hydrogen bomb code) was adopted, which prescribed the creation of a bomb with the TNT equivalent of 1 million. tons and weighing up to 5 tons. The decision provided for the use in the construction of tritium. On the same day the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the Organization of Tritium Production" was adopted.

On the way to the goal set by the Government, it was difficult to overcome the problems.

“As you know, in the hydrogen bomb there is a fusion reaction of tritium T and deuterium D, T + D or T + T. Therefore, to create a hydrogen bomb was needed tritium. In the late 40s - early 50s, when the question of creating a hydrogen bomb arose, there was no tritium in the USSR. (Tritium is unstable, its half-life is 8 years, so in nature, for example, in water, it exists in insignificant quantities.) Tritium can be produced in nuclear reactors operating on enriched uranium. At the beginning of the 1950s, there were no such reactors in the USSR, the only task was to construct them. It was obvious that in a short time, 2-3 years, a significant amount of tritium would not be possible. ”

But simultaneously with the Council of Ministers and the USSR Academy of Sciences, Oleg Aleksandrovich Lavrentiev was concerned about the country's defense capability of the country. He managed to get around the difficulties.

“I met nuclear physics in 1941 when I was in the 7th grade of high school. I read the just-released book “Introduction to Nuclear Physics” (I don’t remember the author), where I found a lot of interesting things for myself. From it, I first learned about the atomic problem, and my blue dream arose - to work in the field of atomic energy.

My further education was prevented by the war. At the age of 18 I volunteered for the front. He participated in the battles for the liberation of the Baltic states. After the war, he served on Sakhalin. There was a favorable situation for me. I managed to retrain from intelligence officers to radiotelegraphists and take up a sergeant position. This was very important, since I began to receive a monetary allowance and was able to write out the books I needed from Moscow, subscribe to the UFN journal. In part there was a library with a rather large selection of technical literature and textbooks. There was a clear goal, and I began to prepare for serious scientific work. In mathematics, I mastered the differential and integral calculus. In physics, he worked the general course of the university program: mechanics, heat, molecular physics, electricity and magnetism, atomic physics. In chemistry - two-volume book of Nekrasov and a textbook for Glinka universities.

A special place in my studies was occupied by nuclear physics. In nuclear physics, I absorbed and assimilated everything that appeared in newspapers, magazines, and radio broadcasts. I was interested in accelerators: from the Cockroft and Walton cascade voltage generator to the cyclotron and betatron; methods of experimental nuclear physics, nuclear reactions of charged particles, nuclear reactions on neutrons, neutron doubling reactions (n, 2n), chain reactions, nuclear reactors and nuclear power engineering, problems of using nuclear energy for military purposes. From the books on nuclear physics I had then: M.I. Korsunsky, "Atomic nucleus"; S.V. Bresler, "Radioactivity"; G. Bethe, "Nuclear Physics."

The idea of ​​using fusion was first born to me in the winter of 1948. The command of the unit commissioned me to prepare a lecture for the personnel on the atomic problem. It was then that the “transition of quantity into quality” occurred. Having a few days to prepare, I rethought all the accumulated material and found a solution to the problems that I had been struggling for for many years: I found a substance - lithium-6 deuteride, which can detonate under the action of an atomic explosion, having strengthened it many times, and came up with a scheme for use in industrial for nuclear reactions on light elements. I came to the idea of ​​the hydrogen bomb through the search for new nuclear chain reactions. Consistently going through various options, I found what I was looking for. The chain with lithium-6 and deuterium was closed along neutrons. Neutron, getting into the Li6 nucleus, causes the reaction: n + Li6 = He4 + T + 4.8 MeV.

Tritium, interacting with the deuterium nucleus according to the scheme: T + D = He4 + n + 4.8 MeV, returns the neutron to the environment of the reacting particles.

The rest was already a matter of technique. In the two volumes of Nekrasov, I found a description of the hydrides. It turned out that it is possible to chemically bind deuterium and lithium-6 into a solid stable substance with a melting point of 700 ° C. To initiate the process, we need a powerful pulsed neutron flux, which is obtained by an atomic bomb. This stream gives rise to nuclear reactions and leads to the release of tremendous energy necessary to heat the substance to fusion temperatures. ”

In the above description, the scheme of the bomb in the elements is similar to the one that was transferred by K. Fuchs to the resident, only in it the liquid deuterium is replaced by lithium deuteride. In this design, tritium is not needed, and this is no longer a device that would have to be brought up on the barge to the enemy coast and be undermined, but a real bomb, if necessary, delivered by a ballistic missile. In modern thermonuclear bombs, only lithium deuteride is used.

Here are excerpts from O.A. Lavrentiev, published in the Siberian Physical Journal N 2, 1996, p. 51-66, published in 200 (two hundred) copies.

“What was to do next? I, of course, understood the importance of the discoveries made by me and the need to convey them to specialists dealing with atomic problems. But I already applied to the Academy of Sciences, in 1946 I sent a proposal there for a fast-neutron nuclear reactor. No reply received. In the Ministry of the Armed Forces sent the invention of guided anti-aircraft missiles. The answer came only after eight months and contained a formal reply in one phrase, where even the name of the invention was distorted. Writing another message in the "instance" was meaningless. In addition, I considered my proposals premature. Until the main task, the creation of atomic weapons in our country, has been solved, no one will be engaged in a “crane in the sky”. Therefore, my plan was to finish high school, to enter Moscow State University and already there, depending on the circumstances, to bring my ideas to specialists.

In September 1948 in the city of Pervomaisk, where our unit was located, a school for working youth opened. Then there was a strict order prohibiting soldiers to attend night school. But our deputy politician managed to convince the unit commander, and three servicemen, including myself, were allowed to attend this school. In May 1949, after completing three classes in a year, I received a certificate of maturity. In July, our demobilization was expected, and I had already prepared documents for the admission office of Moscow State University, but then, quite unexpectedly, they gave me the rank of junior sergeant and were detained for another year.

And I knew how to make a hydrogen bomb. And I wrote a letter to Stalin. It was a short note, just a few phrases that I know the secret of the hydrogen bomb. I did not receive a reply to my letter. After waiting a few months to no avail, I wrote a letter of the same content to the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). The response to this letter was quick. As soon as it reached the addressee, they called from Moscow to the Sakhalin Regional Committee, and a lieutenant colonel of the engineering service Yurganov came to me from Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. As far as I understood, his task was to make sure that I was a normal person with a normal psyche. I spoke with him on general topics, without revealing specific secrets, and he left satisfied. A few days later, the command of the unit received an order to create conditions for me to work. I was assigned a part of the guarded room at the headquarters, and I was able to write my first work on thermonuclear fusion.

The work consisted of two parts. The first part includes a description of the principle of the hydrogen bomb with lithium-6 deuteride as the main explosive and a uranium detonator. It was a barrel construction with two subcritical hemispheres from U235, which were fired towards each other. By the symmetrical arrangement of the charges, I wanted to double the speed of the collision of a critical mass to avoid premature scattering of the substance before the explosion. The uranium detonator was located in the center of a sphere filled with Li6D. The massive shell was supposed to provide inertial retention of the substance during the time of thermonuclear burning. Were given an assessment of the power of the explosion, the method of separation of lithium isotopes, the experimental program of the project ".

Thermonuclear fusion

The second part of the letter - the idea of ​​controlled thermonuclear fusion (TCB), work on which is underway - so far unsuccessfully - is already more than 50 years old worldwide.

“In the second part of the work, a device was proposed for using the energy of nuclear reactions between light elements for industrial purposes. It was a system of two spherical, concentric electrodes. The inner electrode is made in the form of a transparent grid, the outer one is a source of ions. A high negative potential is applied to the grid. Plasma is created by the injection of ions from the surface of the sphere and the emission of secondary electrons from the grid. Plasma insulation is carried out by braking ions in an external electric field, and electrons - in the field of the space charge of the plasma itself.

Of course, I was hurried, and I myself was in a hurry to finish the work faster, since the documents had already been sent to the MSU admissions office and a notification came that they were accepted.

July 21 came the order of my early demobilization. I had to wrap up, although the second part of the work was not yet finished. I wanted to include some additional questions related to the formation of a plasma formation in the center of the sphere, and my thoughts on how to protect the mesh from direct impacts of the particle flux falling on it. All these questions are reflected in my subsequent work.

The work was printed in one copy and sent on July 22, 1950 by secret mail to the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) in the name of the head of the heavy machinery department, I.D. Serbina. (Serbian Ivan Dmitrievich supervised over the Central Committee the most important branches of the defense industry, including the atomic and space technology, participated in the preparation of the flight of the first cosmonaut (hereinafter the OA notes)).

Drafts were destroyed, about which an act was signed, signed by the military clerk of the secret clerical work of sergeant Alexeyev and mine. It was sad to watch the sheets in which I put two weeks of strenuous labor burn in the stove. That was how my service on Sakhalin ended, and in the evening I left for Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk with demobilization documents ... ”

On August 4, 1950, the letter was registered with the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), then it came to the Special Committee under the USSR Council of Ministers, a government body created by the Resolution of the State Defense Committee of August 20, 1945 to manage all the work on the use of atomic energy. L.P. Beria. A letter was received from the committee on the response to A. Sakharov, which was written on August 18, 1950. From the memoirs of A. Sakharov.

“In the summer of 1950, a letter from the secretariat of Beria came from the Beria secretariat proposing a young Pacific Fleet sailor Oleg Lavrentiev ... While reading the letter and writing the comment, I had my first vague thoughts about magnetic thermal insulation. ... In early August 1950, Igor Tamm returned from Moscow. ... He took my thoughts with great interest - all further development of the idea of ​​magnetic insulation was carried out by us together. ” . OA AL continues:

“I arrived in Moscow on August 8. The entrance exams are still going on. I was included in the group of those who were late, and after passing the exams I was accepted into the physics department of Moscow State University.

In September, when I was already a student, I met with Serbin. I expected to get a review on my work, but in vain. Serbin asked me to tell in detail about my proposals for the hydrogen bomb. He listened to me carefully, asked no questions, but at the end of our conversation he told me that there is another way to create a hydrogen bomb, which our scientists are working on. Nevertheless, he suggested that I keep in touch and inform him about all the ideas that I have.

Then he sat me in a separate room and for about half an hour I filled out a questionnaire and wrote an autobiography. This procedure was then required, and subsequently I had to repeat it repeatedly.

A month later I wrote another work on thermonuclear fusion and, through an expedition of the Central Committee, sent it to Serbin. But I did not get a response again, neither positive nor negative. ”

In October 1950, A. Sakharov and I. Tamm set forth the principle of the proposed magnetic fusion reactor design to the first deputy head of the First Main Directorate N.I. Pavlov, and on January 11, 1951 I.V. Kurchatov, I.N. Golovin and A.D. Sakharov appealed to L.P. Beria with a proposal for measures to ensure the construction of a model of a magnetic nuclear reactor.

"Two months have passed. The winter session has begun. I remember after the first math exam, we returned to the hostel late at night. I went into the room, and they told me that they were looking for me and left me the phone number I should call as soon as I come. I called. The man at the other end of the wire introduced himself: "Makhnev, the Minister of Instrumentation." (Makhnev Vasily Alekseevich - Minister of Atomic Industry. This ministry had the code name “The Ministry of Instrument Engineering” and was located in the Kremlin next to the building of the Council of Ministers).

He offered to come to him right now, although the time was later. So he said: "Drive up to the Spassky Gate." I did not immediately understand, asked again, and he patiently began to explain where to go. In the pass office, besides me, there was still only one person. When I received my pass and called my last name, he looked at me carefully. It turned out that we are going in one direction. When we arrived at the reception, Makhnev left the office and introduced us. So I first met Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov.

On the minister's desk, I saw my neatly printed second work, the drawing was made with ink. Someone has already walked through it in red pencil, highlighting individual words and making notes in the margins. Makhnev asked whether Sakharov read this work of mine. It turned out that he was reading the previous one, which made a strong impression on him. He considered my choice of moderate plasma density especially important.

A few days later we met again in the reception room of Makhnev and again late in the evening. Makhnev said that the Chairman of the Special Committee will receive us, but he will have to wait, since he has a meeting. (The special committee is the body in charge of the development of atomic and hydrogen weapons. It was composed of ministers, members of the Politburo and Kurchatov. The chairman was Beria, and the secretary was Makhnev. The meetings of the special committee were held in the Kremlin, in the building of the USSR Council of Ministers).

We had to wait quite a long time, and then we all went to the building of the USSR Council of Ministers. I was struck by the repeated and very thorough verification of documents. The minister stood by and waited patiently while our photos were aligned with the originals. We passed three posts: in the lobby of the building, at the exit from the elevator and in the middle of a rather long corridor. Finally, we ended up in a big, heavily smoked room with a long table in the middle. This, apparently, was the room for meetings of the Special Committee. The windows were open, but the room was not yet ventilated.

Makhnev immediately went to the report, and we remained in the care of young captains with blue shoulder straps. They treated us to lemonade, but then we did not want to drink, and I still regret that I did not try what ministers drank lemonade. Thirty minutes later, Sakharov was called into the office, and ten minutes later I was called. Opening the door, I got into a dimly lit and, as it seemed to me, an empty room. Behind the next door was a large-sized study with a large writing-table and the T-table attached to it, for which an overweight man in a pince-nez rose. He came up, gave his hand, offered to sit down and the first question I was taken aback. He asked: “Do you have teeth that hurt?” I had to explain why my cheeks were puffy. Then it was about parents. I was waiting for questions related to the development of the hydrogen bomb, and was preparing to answer them, but there were no such questions. I think that Beria had all the necessary information about me, my proposals on nuclear fusion and their evaluation by scientists, and these were “looking”. He wanted to look at me and, possibly, on Sakharov.

When our conversation ended, we left the office, and Makhnev still lingered. A few minutes later he came out shining, in total euphoria. And then the unpredictable thing happened: he started offering me a loan. My financial situation was then critical, close to collapse. In the first semester, I did not receive a scholarship, the meager military savings ran out, my mother, who worked as a nurse, could help me poorly. And the dean of the Faculty of Physics, Sokolov, threatened to expel me from the university for non-payment of tuition fees. Nevertheless, it was inconvenient for a minister to take a loan from a student, and for a long time I refused. But Makhnev persuaded me, saying that my position would soon change and I could return the debt.

On this day we left the Kremlin in the first hour of the night. Makhnev offered us his car to drive home. Andrei Dmitrievich refused, so did I, and we walked away from the Spassky Gate towards Okhotny Ryad. I heard from Andrei Dmitrievich many warm words about myself and my work. He assured me that everything would be fine and offered to work together. I, of course, agreed. I really liked this man. Apparently, I then made a favorable impression. We parted at the entrance to the subway. Perhaps we would have talked longer, but the last train was leaving. ”

January 14, 1951 L.P. Beria sent B.L. Vannikov, A.P. Zavenyaginu and I.V. Kurchatov's letter, which notes that the work on the creation of the proposed reactor is of paramount importance, and gives specific tasks for the deployment of work. "Given the special secrecy of developing a new type of reactor, it is necessary to ensure a careful selection of people and measures of proper secrecy of work." In the final part of the letter, Beria wrote: “By the way, we should not forget MSU student Lavrentiev, whose notes and suggestions, according to Comrade Sakharov, were the impetus for the development of a magnetic reactor (these notes were in Glavka at s. Pavlova and Aleksandrov).

I took comrade Lavrentiev. Apparently, he is a very capable man. Call t. Lavrentiev, listen to him and make together with t. Kaftanovym S.V. (Minister of Higher Education of the USSR) to help t. Lavrentiev in school and, if possible, to participate in the work. Term 5 days.

Lavrentiev invited to Glavka.

“We walked up a wide staircase to the second floor of N.I. Pavlova. (Nikolai Ivanovich Pavlov, head of the department of the Main Department, supervised work on the creation of atomic hydrogen weapons).

I've been waiting for a long time. Pavlov immediately called someone, and we went to the other wing of the building: in front of the general, then I, also in military uniform, but without shoulder straps. We went, bypassing the reception, directly into the office to the head of the Main Directorate B.L. Vannikov. I managed to read the sign on the door. There were two in the office: Vannikov in a general's uniform and civilian with a broad black beard, Pavlov sat down at the civilian, and they put me in front of him. For all the time of my service in the army, I did not even have to see the general from a distance, but here I was immediately in front of two. I was not presented with a civilian, and after the meeting I asked Pavlov who this one was with a beard. He somehow mysteriously smiled and replied: "Then you will find out." Then I found out that I was talking to Kurchatov. Questions he asked. I told him in detail about the idea of ​​using nuclear energy between light elements for industrial purposes. He was surprised that the turns of the grid are thick copper pipes cooled by water. I was going to pass a current through them in order to protect it from charged particles with its magnetic field. But here Pavlov intervened in the conversation, interrupted me and said that I was going to insert an atomic bomb there. I realized that they were interested in my first sentence. ”

Report in the name of L.P. Beria: “On your instructions, today we called a first-year student at the Faculty of Physics and Physics of Moscow State University at PSU Lavrentyev O. He spoke about his proposals and his wishes. We consider it appropriate: 1. To establish a personal scholarship - 600 rubles. 2. Free from tuition fees at Moscow State University. 3. Attach for individual classes of qualified teachers of Moscow State University: R.V. Telesin on physics, A.A. Samarsky on mathematics, (to pay for the expense of Glavka). 4. Provide OA.A. for housing one room with an area of ​​14 sq. m in the house of PSU on Gorkovskaya Embankment 32/34, be equipped with furniture and the necessary scientific and technical library. 5. Issue OAA. lump sum 3000 rub. at the expense of PGU ". Signed: B. Vannikov, A. Zavenyagin, I. Kurchatov, N. Pavlov. January 19, 1951

The results of the conversation tells OA.A. “In order to finish university at the suggestion of Kurchatov in four years, I had to“ jump ”from the first course to the third. I received permission from the Minister of Higher Education for a free schedule to attend the first and second year classes at the same time. In addition, I was given the opportunity to study additionally with teachers of physics, mathematics and English. The physicist was soon abandoned, and I had a very good relationship with the mathematician, Alexander Andreyevich Samarsky. I am obliged to him not only by concrete knowledge in the field of mathematical physics, but also by the ability to clearly set the problem, from which its successful and correct solution depended to a large extent.

With Samara, I carried out calculations of magnetic grids; differential equations were compiled and solved, which made it possible to determine the magnitude of the current through the turns of the grid, at which the grid was protected by the magnetic field of this current from bombardment by high-energy plasma particles. This work, completed in March 1951, gave rise to the idea of ​​electromagnetic traps. ...

A pleasant surprise was for me to move from the hostel to the Gorkovskaya Embankment, to a three-room apartment on the seventh floor of a new large house. Makhnev offered me to transport my mother to Moscow, but she refused, and soon one of the rooms was settled. I received an increased scholarship by a special government decree, and I was exempted from tuition fees.

At the beginning of May 1951, the question of my admission to the work carried out in LIPAN (the Institute of Atomic Energy at that time - VS) was finally resolved. Golovin. ... My experimental program looked rather modest. I wanted to start small - with the construction of a small installation, but in the case of quick success I hoped to further develop research on a more serious level. The management reacted approvingly to my program, since considerable funds were not needed to start it: Makhnev called my program “worthless”. But to begin work required the blessing of physicists. I appealed to Pavlov with a request to help me meet with Kurchatov. ”

“Our meeting with Kurchatov was postponed and postponed. In the end, Pavlov suggested that I meet with Golovin, who was Kurchatov's deputy. In October, a detailed discussion of the idea of ​​an electromagnetic trap took place in LIPAN. At the discussion, besides Golovin and Lukyanov, another person was present. He sat quietly in a corner, listened attentively to my explanations, but did not ask questions and did not interfere in our conversations. When the discussion came to an end, he quietly got up and left the audience. Later, from a photograph printed in a book, I learned that it was Tamm. I still do not understand the reasons that prompted him to attend this meeting.

Although not immediately, but after a rather heated discussion, my opponents recognized the idea of ​​an electromagnetic trap as correct, and Golovin formulated a general conclusion that no defects were found in my model. Unfortunately, it was just a statement of the fact that the electromagnetic traps were suitable for receiving and maintaining high-temperature plasma. There were no recommendations to start research, Igor Nikolayevich explained this by the fact that there is an easier way to obtain high-temperature plasma — pinches, where there is already a good start, promising results have been obtained. ... I did not share the opinion of Golovin, but it was useless to argue. As I failed to break through the experimental program, I took up the theory. By June 1952, a report on my work was prepared, containing a detailed description of the idea of ​​an electromagnetic trap and calculations of the parameters of the plasma retained in it. The report was sent for review to MA Leontovich (head of the theoretical work on the TCB), and on June 16, 1952, our first meeting took place.

Leontovich began with a compliment: my idea was very interested and fascinated by him so much that he himself began to make calculations in its justification. With these words, Mikhail Alexandrovich apparently wanted to sweeten the pill that was already prepared for me. This was followed by critical comments, correct in form, but deadly in content ...

My hopes for participation in the development of my first idea also did not come true. After the unsuccessful meeting with Kurchatov and my illness, the question of my involvement in the work on the creation of the hydrogen bomb was no longer raised. For some time, by inertia, I continued to deal with this problem, but then I completely switched to thermonuclear fusion. ”

On this memories O.A. Lavrentiev is running out, but the life of the country and the work on the thermonuclear bomb continued intensively. The veil of secrecy will permanently bury the significance of the letter of O. Lavrentyev for the creation of thermonuclear weapons and TCB.

Laurels and stars

March 5, 1953 dies I.V. Stalin, and in the summer there is a coup d'etat and they kill L.P. Beria A new political leadership of the country is being shaken up in the technical leadership of the Soviet nuclear program, after which the leadership in the program is transferred to the scientific leadership. The program itself continues successfully. August 12, 1953 in the USSR tested the world's first real thermonuclear charge, which uses lithium deuteride. On the participants of the creation of a new weapon laurel leaves and golden stars plentifully sprinkle. Name O.A. Lavrentiev in this cohort is not. The compilers of the award lists, apparently, considered him a man who accidentally pulled out a winning ticket in the life lottery. Recognition of Lavrentiev’s merits called into question the scientific reputation of many individuals, therefore “after graduating from Moscow State University O.A. Lavrentiev, on the recommendation of L.A. Artsimovich (head of the experimental work on fusion at LIPAN) was admitted to the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology. As the saying goes: "Out of sight, out of the heart - out!"

Or maybe everything is simpler, the “housing problem” has always been painful for Muscovites. Sending Laventyev to Kharkov, his lodgings were vacated for the necessary man.

Hydrogen bomb: who gave her a secret?

Under this title, in 1990, an article appeared by employees of the University of California, USA D. Hirsch and W. Matthews (reprinted in UFN, 161, 5, 1991), in which the idea of ​​borrowing the American secret of creating a bomb is being imposed. As was shown above, indeed, in the USA scientific data on this topic were transmitted, but, again, according to American data, this information did not lead to success. O. Lavrentyev's proposals changed the direction of work in the Soviet Union on thermonuclear weapons and prompted scientific research on controlled thermonuclear fusion. By a “strange” coincidence, just a few months after the start of this work in the USSR, such works were intensively developed in the USA.

“In June 1951, E. Teller and F. De-Goffman released a report on the effectiveness of the use of lithium-6 deuteride in the new superbomb scheme. At a conference on superbomb problems held on June 16-17, 1951 in Princeton, the need to produce lithium-6 deuteride was recognized. However, there was no reason for organizing the large-scale production of lithium-6 at that time in the United States. ...

On March 1, 1954, the United States conducted the first thermonuclear explosion in a new series of nuclear tests. ... As a thermonuclear fuel, lithium deuteride with a 40% lithium-6 isotope content was used in this test. And in other tests of this series, lithium deuterite with a relatively low content of lithium-6 was forced to be used. ” “Recently declassified materials and interviews with several scientists who took part in the development of nuclear weapons, make it possible to fully understand how the scientists of the United States, Great Britain and, possibly, the USSR could actually create a hydrogen bomb. Teller avoided this kind of interview ”(I emphasized. - V.S.).

1951, March. The report of the President of Argentina (?!) Peron about the successful demonstration by R. Richter of a controlled thermonuclear reaction led L. Spitzer to the invention of the stellarator in the form of a solenoid in the form of a spatial eight.

1951, July 7th. Signing a research contract at Princeton University (Project Motherhorn). Somewhat later, all work on TCF (pinches at Los Alamos, a mirror trap at Livermore, and others) are combined in the Sherwood Project.

Here you can only say: “I owe money to pay!” The Americans gave us the construction of the atomic bomb, we give them the hydrogen one. It is unclear just who transferred these debts? This, of course, we will not know. L.P. Beria, for all his insight, could not calculate the "mole" among his charges. And in the US intelligence service talkers, like our Bakatin, yet.

Afterword

The arms race has always been and remains a heavy burden on the shoulders of any country and its people, but a golden rain for arms manufacturers and a bargaining chip in the political struggle between and within states. Having come to power, N.S. Khrushchev, to enlist the support of the scientific community, generously distributes rewards.

A. Sakharov, among the elect, becomes an academician and soon three times a Hero. But he begins to satisfy his political ambitions. When his "bucking" is boring LI Brezhnev, Sakharov decide to strictly "punish", deprive the title of Hero and laureate of State Awards. For the “suckers”, the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is published, but for the “initiates” in 1980 the booklet “Nuclear Storm” is published, in which the history of the creation of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons in the USSR is stated in a popular form. It does not have the name of Sakharov, but on pp. 198-199, the work of researchers is lucidly described.

“As time went on. Scientists were engaged in the most difficult, imperceptible work for anyone - they thought. They thought about how to approach the high plasma. As often happens, the suggestion of a non-expert, amateur was the reason for an interesting idea. A letter from Oleg Aleksandrovich Lavrentiev, a serviceman from the Far East, who proposed a method for the synthesis of hydrogen, came to the laboratory to recall. Employees looked and summarized: "The electric field as plasma insulation does not stand up to criticism."

Show! - Igor Evgenievich looked through the letter, nodded his head in agreement with the “sentence”, gave it to the staff, thought. - However ... Give me another look! In this sentence, - Tamm outlined a piece of text with his fingernail, - there is something. It would be necessary to scroll ...

The high-ranking young people brought up in the Tamm traditions immediately prepared a letter addressed to the authorities, where they reported that it was Lavrentiev's idea that prompted the proposal to create a magnetic thermonuclear reactor. ”

So for the first time in many years, the name of Lavrentyev OA is mentioned, “offering a method of hydrogen synthesis” (?). For the author of the book Borul VL the name of the serviceman and the whole episode was a meaningless gibberish. But for the participant of the book editing, Igor Nikolayevich Golovin is a key place. Through him, Sakharov's “old colleagues” were warned by members of the Politburo: “We know and remember who is who”.

At present, there are few chances to bring the “thinker and human rights activist” to the former pedestal. But the remaining "orphan" scientific achievements of thermonuclear fusion are again divided between "their own". G.A. Goncharov writes: “March 3, 1949 V.L. Ginsburg released a report using Li6D in a puff. Estimating the efficiency of using lithium-6 deuteride in the “puff”, in this report he already took into account the formation of tritium in the capture of neutrons by lithium-6. ” About the same report writes B.D. Bondarenko: “We emphasize in fairness that the use of a solid chemical compound (briquette) Li6D as a thermonuclear fuel has been proposed by V.L. Ginzburg in March 1949, and O.A. Lavrentiev - in July 1950. This set priorities. "

That Ginzburg V.L. in this report, metal lithium was considered as a thermonuclear fuel, along with deuterium, is not an achievement. At that time, the lithium nuclear reaction was written in textbooks.

And prioritized about the idea of ​​using a chemical compound of lithium and deuterium raise serious doubts. "On June 25, 1955, a report was issued on the design choice and theoretical calculation of the charge of the RDS-37" (hydrogen-lithium bomb); the list of its authors (31 people) does not include the name of Ginzburg VL. There is no Lavrentieva O. A., this is understandable - “non-specialist, amateur”. But Ginzburg, along with Sakharov, came to Tamm's group. Why this idea did not start to be realized before the letter of O.A. Lavrentiev? Report Ginzburg V.L. still not published, is it registered in the archive or is it in the personal library?

Open letter
   President of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
   Academician Osipov Yu.S.

Dear Yury Sergeevich! “Fathers of the idea of ​​controlled thermonuclear fusion (Fusion) with magnetic confinement of hot plasma in thermonuclear reactors are considered AD Sakharov and I.E. There M. Yes, this is true, but the fact that the name of O.A. Lavrentyev is almost never mentioned at all is certainly a great injustice, ”writes B.D. Bondarenko (UFN 171, N8, p. 886 (2001)).

I fully agree with this statement, especially since A.D. Sakharov and I.E. Tamm offered only one of the directions of TCB. If someone can be given the high title of “father of the idea of ​​TCB”, then it should be given only to O.A. Lavrentiev, who initiated TCB work in the world.

Unfortunately, the goal has not yet been achieved, the industrial production of energy through the synthesis of light elements, and, in my opinion, will not be achieved until we get rid of the false ideas about the nature of electromagnetic radiation. But this does not detract from the merits of O.A. Lavrentiev, especially since there is no other way to resolve the speedy energy hunger for humanity. Therefore, it seems that, given the contribution of O.A. Lavrentyeva in UTS, there will be a partial correction of the admitted injustice, the election of a doctor of physical and mathematical sciences, a leading researcher at the Kharkov Physical and Technical Institute, Oleg Alexandrovich Lavrentiev at the next session of the Russian Academy of Sciences. And more complete - given the contribution of O.A. Lavrentiev in the country's defense capability, justify on the basis of archival documents the Presentation of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences to the President of the Russian Federation for the award of O.A. Lavrentiev Golden Star Hero of Russia. A country should evaluate its citizens on business!